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


CLIENTELISM IN THE CHANGING  
ITALIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

JAMES MITSATSOS


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
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## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the members of my committee whose high standards, frequent feedback, and continuous support enabled me to reach my fullest potential. I am especially grateful to my chairman, Dr. Z. Anthony Kruszewski for his selfless assistance, guidance, and encouragement in completing this project.

CLIENTELISM IN THE CHANGING  
ITALIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

by

JAMES MITSATSOS, BA

THESIS

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## Chapter 1

### INTRODUCTION

During the March 1994 Italian national elections voters selected a new group of political leaders to govern Italy. The Forza Italia Party founded by Silvio Berlusconi, the National Alliance, a conglomeration of right-wing parties of which the Italian Social Movement (MSI) led by Gianfranco Fini was the largest and the Northern League of Umberto Bossi were swept into power and replaced an existing power structure that had governed the country since the end of WWII. These parties signified a major break from the previous political system due to the complete exclusion from government of the Christian Democrats and their coalition partners, the Social Democrats, Socialists, Liberals, and Republicans.

Throughout the Cold War period, the Italian political system was built around two major political parties: the Christian Democrats and the Italian Communist Party. The Christian Democrats, firmly entrenched in the West's sphere of influence strove to maintain power at all costs and not

allow the Communists to govern. To accomplish this they established a pattern of forming governments with parties to their Right and Left that were committed to the western principles of liberal democracy, free market economics and military alliances. This ensured an absolute coalition that always excluded the Italian Communist Party and the Fascist Italian Social Movement from participation in government. As the largest of all governmental political parties the Christian Democrats were under great pressure to maintain and expand their organization and influence throughout the country. They accomplished this through the establishment of patron-clientelistic links that encompassed the whole country and connected the capital to the periphery.

The links which were strongest in the south functioned on the principle that the political parties in power would provide such patronage services as jobs in state controlled agencies or public works projects in return for guaranteed votes. Throughout the whole peninsula, daily requirements of routine life were centered around the need to interface with a government official to carry-out essential elements of everyday life (building permits, day-care centers, employment). This official (patron) who was in a position

to grant these favors would do so, providing the individual (client) belonged to his party and voted for the party.

This system became the standard method by which the political parties operated.

Until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Italian political parties continued in power utilizing their clientelistic connections enhanced by corruption and coercion. While the "specter of Communism" haunted the West, the populace accepted this arrangement. The end of the Cold War destabilized Italian politics. It questioned the need to maintain a corrupt Christian Democratic party and an increasingly outdated Communist party.

The reduction of tensions enabled people to focus on their political institutions. What they discovered was nothing short of a political horror story. The Christian Democrats and their allies were exposed as a corrupt, clientelistic organization functioning solely to maintain their own political class in power. The Communists were found to have received funds from the USSR, participated in the spoils system and cooperated secretly with the government they so frequently criticized.

These political earthquakes which shocked the nation

allowed smaller parties to enter onto the political stage. One of these, the Northern League, a regionalist party located in Italy's northern provinces increased its popularity dramatically with its calls for honest government, greater autonomy for the northern regions, a disassociation from the south and the prosecution of politicians involved in the scandals. A second party the Italian Social Movement, founded by ex-Fascists saw its popularity slightly rise since it was not tainted by any corruption scandal since it had never been in government.

The first test of these events were the April 1992 elections. These resulted for the first time in the Christian Democrats receiving less than 30% of the vote. The Northern League which previously had only 0.5% of the national voted received a stunning 8.5%. This served as a "wake-up" call to the political establishment that the old status quo ante would not survive any longer. Two years later the demise of the post-war political system occurred with the victory of the three party center-right coalition Freedom Alliance. No parties that held office previously were elected.

This thesis focuses on the collapse of a clientelistic

based political system. It examines the causes of clientelism in Italy, the formation of the political system since unification, and the emergence of new political parties such as Forza Italia, the Northern League, the Democratic Party of the Left and the National Alliance.

### **Review of Literature**

The subject of clientelism contained an extensive amount of sources. The literature encompassed the full scope of the social sciences as it explored clientelism from anthropological, sociological, historical and political perspectives. Foremost in this review were the works of Legg, Lemarchand, Clapham, Graziano and Roninger whose research provided an invaluable asset in understanding the Italian political system.

Legg and Lemarchand's "Political Clientelism and Development" in Analyzing the Third World, editor Norman Provizer, listed a four part description of clientelism as composed of personalized and reciprocal relationships between two unequal actors who command unequal resources. This explanation is further divided into a political context where the relationship may be between people or groups such as political parties, organizations or even governments that



extend beyond the two person relationship. They point out that patron-client relationships in the political sphere are not limited to two people but to an infinite amount of actors who establish a network of hierarchical structures where individuals are patrons and clients to those above and below them. What results is a massive system of reciprocities extending across a segment or over the whole society. Legg and Lemarchand see this act as serving as an aide to modernization and integration of society. Through clientelism the center and periphery are linked through networks which would foster greater input in policy and result in more stability.<sup>1</sup>

Clapham's "Clientelism and the State," in Private Patronage and Public Power. Political Clientelism in the Modern State, editor Christopher Clapham, focused on the relationship between clientelism and the power of the state as a distributor of clientelism and coercion. Clapham considers clientelism as a means by which the state can settle competing claims through the distribution of benefits to groups and individuals who would have a vested interest

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<sup>1</sup>Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," In Analyzing The Third World, ed. Norman Provizer (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1978), 120-148

in the state. He regards the patron-client bond as a moral obligation between individuals that is not forceful and at times voluntary. This personal relationship stands in direct contradiction to the public morality of which a state would expect society to behave (pay taxes, obey laws). He finds that it is when the private morality comes into conflict with the public morality that corruption and crime occurs.

Clapham sets down several necessary conditions for clientelism's survival. He points out that critical resources must be controlled by a particular group in a society such as jobs, land and economic allocation. To distribute these resources patrons must require services of their clients in order for the allocation to be cost effective. The clients should not have access to the resources and the allocation should be particularistic and not universalistic. Under these conditions clientelism will continue either in the public or private domain. Its decline is often fostered by the parties considering the relationship as not cost effective, the patron or the client is not needed or an impersonal governments successfully

imposed universalistic standards.<sup>2</sup>

Walston's book, The Mafia and Clientelism. Road to Rome in Post-War Calabria, seeks to explain how politics are conducted in southern Italy. In this region, Walston finds a stronger bond between patron and client since it's a poorer area and the client is dependent on the patron for survival. Walston observes that within the society, clientelism is not considered illegal or immoral. In the southern society Walston discussed the differences between what he calls "traditional and modern clientelism." He finds that with the development of society clientelism moves away from a specific individual and centers itself in large organizations. Therefore present day clientelism centers around the vote, role of bureaucracy in the distribution of resources, mass parties and non-ideological factions with political parties. State agencies are involved in most sectors of the society and notes that in southern Italy, bureaucracies perform in a personalistic manner rather than the impersonal manner in the north. This often leads to the state becoming a patron rather than an executioner of state

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<sup>2</sup>Christopher Clapham. "Clientelism and the State." In Private Patronage and Public Power. Political Clientelism in the Modern State, ed. Christopher Clapham (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 1-35.

policy.<sup>3</sup>

Legg's Patrons, Clients, and Politicians. New Perspectives on Political Clientelism notes that contrary to modernization theory which predicts the end of clientelism in the modern state, most advanced industrial societies display the same clientelistic characteristics as in underdeveloped systems. Legg characterizes patron-client relationships as either vertical (patron is in control) or horizontal (the relationship is equal). Legg found that the expansion of the state into the periphery took on a clientelistic relationship with the exchange of a vote for a job. He also observed that the links between the periphery and the center were clientelistic and continue to the present. Legg counters the modernist argument that influences and equality are not consistent with clientelism. Although it may be theoretically correct in practice, Legg found that individuals still pushed for particularistic demands for policy adjustments in specific areas such as

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<sup>3</sup>James Walston, The Mafia and Clientelism: Roads to Rome in Post-War Calabria (London: Routledge, 1988).

family and friends.<sup>4</sup>

Graziano's "A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Clientelistic Behavior" in the European Journal of Political Research, considers the "exchange" in the patron-client relationship as the one property which unifies the social, political, traditional and modern aspects of clientelism. This exchange can take on different forms. One form that Graziano considers most crucial is the "gift." This is used either as a cash or material incentive to enhance the exchange and gain greater control over the individual. This gift or bribe as others may call it guarantees reciprocity. Graziano extends the gift concept to the political party machine where professional politicians require gifts since they live off the rewards they dispense. Graziano then notes that party officials become dependent on gifts in exchange for favors and lose their commitments to the goals of the party.<sup>5</sup>

Roninger's "The Comparative Study of Clientelism and

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<sup>4</sup>Keith R. Legg, Patrons, Clients, and Politicians. New Perspectives on Political Clientelism, Working Papers on Development: 3 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1975).

<sup>5</sup>Luigi Graziano, "A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Clientelistic Behavior," European Journal of Political Research 4 (1976): 149-174.

the Changing Nature of Civil Society" in The Contemporary World in Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society, editor Luis Roninger, notes also that clientelism still has not disappeared and is still an integral part of many societies. He identifies new forms of clientelism that cut across levels of economic development and political regimes. Roninger observes that although clientelism is an unequal relationship, it is not always set in the patron's favor. A patron's position is continuously threatened by forces supporting universalistic principles, competition from other patron and other forces previously excluded. Patrons, therefore, must be willing to compromise since clients receive benefits from the patron. This results in what Roninger calls a "double transformation:" an abdication of autonomy where at any specific moment in the relationship the patron or the client could be in the dominant position.<sup>6</sup>

The subject of the Italian political system is covered extensively by David Hine's Governing Italy, The Principle of Bargained Pluralism, Paul Furlong's Modern Italy. Representation and Reform and Joseph La Palomabra's

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<sup>6</sup>Luis Roninger, "The Comparative Study of Clientelism and the Changing Nature of Civil Society in The Contemporary World," In Democracy and Clientelism in Civil Society, ed. Luis Roninger (Bolder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 1-27.

Democracy Italian Style. All three authors provide an in-depth look at Italian politics since 1945. Hine investigates how political attitudes are shaped and how demands are expressed through political parties. He also considers the constitutional and administrative structures through which parties and interest groups achieve their goals. Hine presents a rational account of the operation of the political system. His excellent explanation of the function of state institutions indicates that political institutions are at the mercy of the political parties and cannot stand independently. His conclusion is that the failure of the political system is due to the inability of the political system to convert the demands of its citizens into effective cohesive policy which he attributes to the power of political parties to modify policy proposals to suite their demands.<sup>7</sup>

Furlong examines the political system in its policy making role. He provides an insightful analysis of the function of the political system as it attempts to formulate and implement public policy. Furlong reviewed Italy's

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<sup>7</sup>David Hine, Governing Italy: The Politics of Bargained Pluralism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

historical record of policy failures and success and finds that its ability to make and enforce policy is increasingly difficult in a state where the bureaucracy, tasked with drafting and carrying out policy is increasingly in conflict with professional and clientelistic groups. These organizations involved in the bureaucracy's welfare and service functions hinder the state since the bureaucracy lacks the organization, revenues and moral autonomy to ensure its predominance.

Within the state and the non-governmental organizations there is a division on how to proceed with policy. This places certain segments of the state bureaucracy in alliance with outside groups while battling elements within their own organizations. Bargains and agreements are struck between the state and the most powerful groups which offer more resources to exchange for enactment of policy. What Furlong observes is that the state at times becomes a client to these organizations since the state concedes more than organizations than do in its bargaining.<sup>8</sup>

La Palombara presents a view of Italy that supports the

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<sup>8</sup>Paul Furlong, Modern Italy: Representation and Reform (London: Reutledge, 1994).



recently deposed political system. He perceives the political life of compromise, bargains and party rule as the means by which the nation remained unified. Although not making any apologies for the shortcomings of the Italian political system, La Palombara makes it very clear the system is molded by the Italian culture and challenges the conventional thinking that democracy should follow established rules on a British or American model.<sup>9</sup>

Journal articles were adequate to complete my research. These articles were extremely informative and timely in reporting the most recent changes in Italian politics such as changes in political parties, the continuing bribery scandals, the emergence of the Northern League and National Alliance parties and 1992 and 1994 election results.

### **Hypothesis**

Due to the implosion of the Clientelistic System in Italy and the exposure of political corruption, the public became disillusioned with the existing political parties. The appeal of the Northern League to the electorate for honest and efficient government resulted in the party

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<sup>9</sup>Joseph La Pa Lombara, Democracy: (London: Yale University Press, 1987).

winning enough votes to enter the government as part of the ruling coalition in May 1994. Once in power, and contrary to its campaign pledges, the League demanded control of several government ministries and corporations rich in patronage positions. This attempt to expand its influence through employment was characteristic of the recently discredited political system. Consequently, clientelism reemerged onto the political scene performing its previous function with new patrons and clients.

### **Methodology**

An interpretive method based on historical and current events will be used to test the hypothesis. The following chapter will discuss the theory of Clientelism and its application to pre-WWII Italy. Chapter three is an investigation into the post-war political system that includes the political parties, the nation's political institutions, its two largest political parties up until 1994 and an analysis of the 1992 and 1994 elections. Chapter four is an examination of the Northern League, the National alliance and the role of the main opposition parties the Democratic Party of the Left and the Italian Peoples Party. The last chapter reviews the events since

the March 1994 national election and includes a summation and conclusion.

## Chapter Two

### THEORY OF CLIENTELISM

Clientelism, the power of personal relations is a world-wide occurrence which has existed in all societies at some point in their development and helps explain the workings of a society's political system in its different phases of development.<sup>10</sup> Diverse studies ranging from examinations of village life in South East Asia and Africa, and studies of modern mass political parties in southern Europe and Latin America have focused on the role of patron-client relations in building some aspect of social order, such as control of resources, interpersonal exchange, governmental and societal interaction.<sup>11</sup>

Clientelism as defined by Lemarchand and Legg is "a

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<sup>10</sup>M. Caciagli, "Il Clientelismo nel Terzo Mondo," (Clientelism in the Third World) Rivista di Scienza Politica, (Political Science Review) 19 (August 1989) :329, quoted in Maria C. Pitrone, "Clientelismo Sistema Politico: Rassegna Critica Delle Teorie," Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale 14 (Sept. 1993) : 103-130. System of Political Clientelism: Critical Review of Theories in Sociology and Social Research.

<sup>11</sup>James Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review 66 (March 1972) : 91-113 ; Rene Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa," American Political Science Review 66 (March 1972) : 68-90; Yves Meny, Government and Politics in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) : 38-98; Paul Commack, Democratization and Citizenship in Latin America, in Democracy and Democratization, ed. Geraint Parry and Michale Moran, (London: Routledge, 1994), 189-190.

personalized relationship between an inferior and a superior commanding unequal resources."<sup>12</sup> This implies there is usually a personal contact between the patron (the superior) and the client (the inferior). They perform certain obligations for each other which stand opposed to the perceived ideal type of bureaucratic structure employing the norms of rationality, anonymity and universals. The relationship is of a long duration which serves only the parties involved and is not viewed by the society as illegal or immoral.<sup>13</sup> This relationship is usually not coercive and at times borders on the voluntary. It applies to the individual whose need for protection, work, or survival binds him to a person or an organization where each party will exchange services beneficial to the other. Frequently these exchanges run contrary to the established methods of interaction.

Lemarchand and Legg define Political Clientelism, a subset of clientelism, as "a transaction between actors with

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<sup>12</sup>Lemarchand and Legg, Political Clienteles and Development: A Preliminary Analysis, 122.

<sup>13</sup>James Walston, The Mafia and Clientelism, 2; Ernest Gellner, "Patrons and Clients" in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (Liverpool: Duckworth, 1977), 4.

unequal resources which has political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of the patron-client relationship."<sup>14</sup>

Clientelism is often associated with the political spoils system designed to enable those in power to benefit through the use of patronage. This is not always the case. Within each society, there are numerous legal jobs and projects approved by the state that the party in power has the right to appoint individuals to these positions. In the United States, the President is authorized by law to fill 3-4 thousand vacancies in the federal bureaucracy with the US Senate's approval. These positions may be considered clientelistic since he may appoint friends of people to whom he owes a political favor. However, this practice is not condemned since it is performed in the public arena and is authorized by law. Jobs or positions created without proper authorization fall into the illegal category that is frequently associated with the negative aspects of the spoils system. These could include placing people on a payroll without them ever coming to work, creating jobs for

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<sup>14</sup>Lemarchand and Legg, Political Clientelism and Development, 122-123.

relatives or close friends or accepting bribes for employment.

Political clientelism's purpose is to ensure that resources are accessible and they flow on an orderly basis. In traditional agrarian societies, resources were controlled at the local level by a group of notables, usually wealthy landowners, who distributed these to their clients in a personalized and particularistic manner, so that the individual and not the whole group received the benefit. Industrial societies theoretically distributed resources by the state in a non-personal, universal manner designed to ensure fairness and equal access of opportunity. Despite these methods clientelism still exists throughout the world. These practices involve the personalization of state policies that result in passing special laws for certain individuals, exemptions granted to a group and political corruption such as bribes for campaign contributions. The durability of clientelism is evident by its ability to survive and adapt from a traditional agrarian society to the modern industrial state. The supposed characteristics of pre-industrial traditional societies such as affectivity, particularism and diffuseness are still utilized today when





deciding how resources are distributed.<sup>15</sup> Clientelism survives today due to the inability of the state to sever its personalized links with the society and its inability to ensure equality and fairness in official matters.

Zuckerman, Lemarchand and Legg cite several variables that explain its emergence and continuity. Foremost is the environmental factor of an individual's need for security. Since the state could not ensure the individual's safety or security, the patron had to protect the client. A second factor was the surplus of agricultural production with the control of economic assets by a patron who was in a position to dispense benefits.<sup>16</sup> Clapham describes clientelism as existing between two opposites of personal and impersonal allocation. "A zone in which rulers control reasonable effective means of allocation but are not prevented by entrenched bureaucratic norms from turning those to personal

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<sup>15</sup>Talcott Parsons, On Institutions and Social Evolution, Selected Writings ed. Leon H. Mayhew (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 106-114. Parsons identifies five pattern variables that describe modern and traditional societies. He positions them against each other to show the contrast. The first variable of the pair is the modern description. The variables are as follows: affective neutral vs affectivity, collectively-orientation vs self-orientation, universalism vs particularism, achievement vs ascription and specificity vs diffuseness.

<sup>16</sup>Alan Zuckerman, Political Clienteles in Power: Party Factions and Cabinet Coalitions in Italy, Comparative Politics Series, ed. Aristide R. Zolberg and Richard L. Merrit, No. 01-055 (London: Sage Publications, 1975), 12; Lemarchand and Legg, Political Clientelism and Development, 128.

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it allows bargaining amongst equals or groups.<sup>31</sup> In modern day patron-client relations, the individual would receive a favor from a state official or party functionary in return for the individual's support at election time.

In the patron-client relationship, face to face contact is strongly stressed. These affective ties display the emotional part of the relationship.<sup>32</sup> The degree of affectivity determines the type of relationship. This relationship entails diffuse exchanges and is not bound by inflexible exchanges. The parties employ a flexible line which ensures its survival.<sup>33</sup> Relationships survive as long as the parties have something to offer to each other.

Legg identifies two types of bonds existing in patron-client relations: multiple and simplex. Multiple bonds are those which involve many exchanges between patron and client and simplex bonds are impersonal relations of a contract type. Multiple bonds reflect the traditional patron-client

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<sup>31</sup>Lemarchand and Legg, Political Clientelism and Development, 123.

<sup>32</sup>Affective is Parson's pattern variable evident in traditional societies which refers to the tendency of traditional individuals to view others in emotional terms heavily colored by personal values.

<sup>33</sup>An example of patron-client flexibility would be the case where a client would help pay for the wedding of his patron's daughter while at a latter date the patron may pay for the education of his client's son.

ties and are predicated on the status of the two individuals involved.<sup>34</sup> Since all patron-client relationships are founded on inequity or imbalance of status the wider the gap between patron and client the more affectivity is needed to maintain the relationship.

The wide degree of affectivity results from a patron being far removed from his clients and therefore losing the personalized link which determines the client's loyalty to the patron. To counter this the patron needs to be seen by his clients as a member of the group he represents.<sup>35</sup> He must deliver resources to the community, and identify with the needs of the group. The client, the poorer of the two, has less resources to offer and feels the patron must allocate resources for his loyalty.

In most traditional societies the client must accede to the demands of his patron since patrons usually control vital resources such as land, water and employment. In today's modern patron-client relationship the client is in a stronger position since he can find other patrons in a

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<sup>34</sup>Legg, Patrons, Clients and Politicians, 10.

<sup>35</sup>Ayata, Clientelism: Premodern, Modern and Postmodern, 23-24.

political party or state apparatus. The strength of a client in relationship to a patron is a dynamic situation if: (1) the client has highly valuable services with which to reciprocate, (2) he chooses among competing patrons, (3) force is available to him, or (4) he can manage without the patron's help. These factors are constantly changing and require a continuous re-evaluation of the relationship.<sup>36</sup>

Despite enjoying a favorable balance, the patron cannot take his position for granted. His standing in the community is constantly challenged by other patron competitors and groups opposed to particularistic policies and favoring universalistic policies. When these issues appear the patron requires the support of his clients. Pure force and coercion are not enough to ensure the client's support. Reciprocation and bargaining between patron and client are essential. Both patron and client must give up some of their benefits in order to maintain the relationship. This may include providing the patron with immediate resources that he could draw on and in return the patron, if successful, would protect the client from

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<sup>36</sup>Scott, Patron-Client Politics, 94.

physical or economic insecurity, or provide him with goods and services.

This results in a "double transformation" which requires the client to give up some of his autonomy in return for "a relaxation of hierarchical control on the patron's part."<sup>37</sup> In order for the relationship to continue the client must believe that what he has entered into is correct and accepts the patron's position as valid. In effect he has conferred legitimacy on the patron.

This recognition of legitimacy is predicated on the client's evaluation of the ratio of services received to those provided.<sup>38</sup> These services are proportionate to the amount of legitimacy he confers to the patron. The reverse is true vis-à-vis the patron who evaluates as legitimate the services received from the client. Therefore in order for the patron to maintain his legitimacy and respect amongst his clients, resources must be employed in order to meet the needs of his clients.

Amongst the rural traditional societies and even in

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<sup>37</sup>Ronninger, Comparative Study of Clientelism, 4.

<sup>38</sup>James Scott, Patronage or Exploitation in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (Liverpool: Duckworkth, 1977), 25-26.

modern rural life, patrons are expected to show their generosity at village wide events such as weddings, religious activities or local festivals.<sup>39</sup> These actions enhance the status of the patron and become a set of social debts which are used for favors at a future date. The debts to patrons and services to clients comprise the exchange relationship between patron and client.

Graziano, Scott, Lemarchand and Legg, and Clapham all point to the importance of the process of exchange between patron and client. It is considered as the one property which unifies all the aspects of the clientelistic phenomena.<sup>40</sup> Exchange or reciprocity is necessary in order for each person in the dyad to accomplish their goals. The value of the exchange is usually not equal in monetary terms and reflects the difference between patron's and client's wealth and status. Due to their subordinate position clients offer more in exchange than patrons. Therefore, exchanges between patron and client are not routine. They are diverse and dependent on the structure of the society

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 27-28.

<sup>40</sup>Graziano, Conceptual Framework, 157; Scott, Patronage or Exploitation, 22; Lemarchand and Legg, Political Clientelism and Development, 126-127; Clapham, Clientelism and the State, 12-13.

and the political situation. The continuation of exchanges when expanded to the whole society eventually results in a total clientelistic system of successful exchanges with their individual rules, codes, expectations and obligations. Once this becomes institutionalized into society, it bypasses the institutions of the state and eventually either challenges the state for supremacy or forces itself into state structures such as the former Christian Democratic Party of Italy.

The process of exchanges requires the patron provide the client: (1) a basic means of subsistence, (2) subsistence crisis insurance, and (3) protection from outside forces, brokerage services and influence. The client offers the patron: (1) services such as manual labor, (2) supplementary labor and goods such as water and firewood to the patron's house, personal domestic service, food offering-now replaced by cash, and (3) promotion of patron's interests such as protecting his reputation, act as his eyes and ears, and campaign for him.<sup>41</sup>

In modern societies, services are repaid in jobs,

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<sup>41</sup>Scott, Patronage or Exploitation, 23-24.



permits, loans, or the vote. Walston notes that modern clientelism does not require the patron to be in "direct control of the resources." In today's society especially in southern Europe the most common patron-client relationship is between the candidate and the electorate.<sup>42</sup> The client will use the vote as the reciprocity exchange and thereby complete the transaction.

The ability of a patron to confer resources ensures his position in the society. Resources are of several types. Boussevain lists two types which he labels as first and second order resources. First order resources are under the patron's direct control and second order resources belong to someone else or another institution controlled by the patron.<sup>43</sup>

Scott distinguishes resources by security. He categorizes them as: (1) most secure: such as personal knowledge and skills, (2) next most secure: such as direct control of personal real property, and (3) least secure: such as resources based on control or use of the property or

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<sup>42</sup>Walston, The Mafia and Clientelism, 27-29.

<sup>43</sup>Jeremy Boissevain, Patrons and Brokers, unpublished manuscript, 1969, 6-7 quoted in Legg, Patrons, Clients and Politicians, 4-5.

authority of others.<sup>44</sup> The judicial use and distribution of resources determines the success or failure of the patrons endeavors. Patrons will always use their most secure resources such as knowledge, money or people that they directly control rather than having to bargain with another patron for second-order resources. Keeping in mind that resources such as land, people and money are finite, the patron must strategically employ these assets so they will do the most good. The clients as well control resources and use the assets as bargaining chips in enhancing their positions in the patron-client relationship. These include but are not limited to labor and economic support to the patron in the form of rent, military or fighting duties on behalf of the patron and political services such as voting or acting as an agent of the patron.<sup>45</sup>

The dyadic relationship between the client and the patron does not necessarily stop at the local level. Paired relationships extend upward through the chain of command from the periphery to the center.

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<sup>44</sup>Scott, Patron-Client Politics, 94-95.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid. , 98.

Legg and Lemarchand call this paired relationship which links patron and client is known as a role set. Each level in the chain of command from the periphery to the center contains a role-set. This results in a client also performing as a patron to someone below him in the role-set. Groups of these role-sets constitute a "clientage network."<sup>46</sup> This network contains a series of role-sets where reciprocities extend across a whole or part of a segment of society such as mass political parties or despotic regimes.

These linkages are supplied through middlemen known as "social brokers" who "bridge the gap in communications between persons, group structure and even culture."<sup>47</sup> The broker whose influence increases as the state expands becomes a necessary link in ensuring bureaucratic action reaches the periphery. As society modernized, brokers provided the association between people that eventually superseded kinship. Modernization of society has seen the broker's function increasingly taken over by interest

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<sup>46</sup>Legg and Lemarchand, Political Clientelism and Development, 124.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid . , 124.

groups, and political parties. The role of broker and patron is nebulous. Frequently these two functions are performed by the same person but not at the same time.<sup>48</sup> Some differences between patron and broker are that the patron has control over resources while the broker only puts people together. Within their role as brokers they perform the vital role of enhancing the patron-client exchange to take place. The broker whose influence increases as the state expands, becomes a necessary link in ensuring bureaucratic action reaches the periphery.

#### **Clientelism and the State**

The modern nation-state is founded on the hierarchical structure composed of permanent state employed officials whose organizations are led by temporary elected political leaders, the ability to impose state control over a designated piece of territory and the right of the state to control certain functions such as the use of force, taxation and regulation.<sup>49</sup> In the event this cannot be done the

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<sup>48</sup>Scott, Patron-Client Politics, 95-96.

<sup>49</sup>Clapham, Clientelism and the State, 18.

citizen for his own survival turns to a patron who does this for him.<sup>50</sup>

It is at this certain point when the state is an "Incomplete State" and cannot control all of its territory that clientelism flourishes.<sup>51</sup> It then allows local officials to operate in the area and serve as brokers between the central requirements and local interest. It can only maintain control through the development and emergence of structures such as an army, bureaucracy, political parties and professional politicians along with the resources necessary to cope with the various crises of modernization such as electoral systems, civil rights, and access to education, employment and health care.<sup>52</sup>

The ability for a state to control its territory and conglomerate all the factions within the polity is the process of integration. Clientelism has served as a vehicle for this. Lemarchand, in his study of Senegal identifies

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<sup>50</sup>Pitrone, Clientelismo e Sistema Politico, 1-5.

<sup>51</sup>Gellner, Patrons and Clients, 8.

<sup>52</sup>Graziano, Luigi, "Center-Periphery Relations and the Italian Crisis: The Problem of Clientelism" in Territorial Politics in Industrialized Nations ed. Sidney Tarrow, Peter J. Katzenstein and Luigi Graziano (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), 297.

some clientelistic characteristic such as a pyramiding of patron-client ties, a spillover of reciprocities, and changing partnerships that could serve as models for integration.<sup>53</sup> It tends to foster integration through party directed patronage where the expansion of the state enters into the periphery.

This is done through the mass party such as the "Christian Democrats" in Italy. The degree of integration of a state is most noticeable in relations between the center and the periphery. This has usually been associated with the formation and maintenance of clientelistic networks. The hierarchical structure of clientelism, places the patrons as mediators between the center and the periphery resulting in clientelistic links being formed between national and local leaders as seen in nineteenth century France and Italy.<sup>54</sup> Through the expansion of the state into the periphery, clientelistic networks increased, ushering in political integration. This allowed local patrons to increase their own fortunes and status from their

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<sup>53</sup>Lemarchand, Political Clientelism in Africa, 72.

<sup>54</sup>Legg, Patrons, Clients and Politicians, 32-33.

dealings with the central government.

The expansion of the core into the periphery is usually done through a series of moves that should benefit it the most. Two situations under which the core expands economically into the periphery are by either using the core's ruling classes to eliminate the basis of power of the periphery's ruling classes or the core's ruling classes can enlist the support of the periphery's classes.<sup>55</sup> The first strategy either results in the destruction of the local ruling classes and the imposition of the state's central administration, while in the second the elites of the core and periphery form an alliance with each other. The locals working with the center would implement the laws and policies of the state and form alliances and loyalties gained by the distribution of benefits or other material advantages. The determining factor in whether a state has legitimized the rule of law, order and representation is the emergence of a constitution.

In a democracy, three conditions are required. They are: (1) regular, free and fair elections of representatives

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<sup>55</sup>Alberto. Palloni, "Internal Colonialism or Clientelistic Politics? The Case of Southern Italy," Ethics and Racial Studies, 2 (July 1979) : 362.

with universal and equal suffrage, (2) responsibility of the state apparatus to the elected parliament, (3) freedoms of expression and association as well as the protection of individual rights against arbitrary state action.<sup>56</sup>

Using these principles as a guide, constitutions were written that incorporated universalistic standards of public behavior and rules of how governments and officials should perform. These rules concentrated on institutions of representation that aimed at ensuring the accountability of rulers through elections, and law, and for the distribution of power in society. These rules constitute acceptance of norms and attitudes allowing for a neutral political language that binds various groups together that function in a common society. The Italian Constitution guarantees fairness, equality, and application of universal standards for all its citizens in public matters. These principles have removed the need for individuals to seek out patrons in order to assist them in receiving their entitlements. However, the key to success is how effective the constitution and therefore the institutions of the state

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<sup>56</sup>Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, 43.



have been in ensuring its implementation. When the state cannot fully implement the constitution, it can be detrimental to its institutions and the democratic process since clientelism has a constraining effect on the implementation of universalistic policies and discourages development of citizen participation and support as a requirement to general policy implementation.<sup>57</sup>

Beniamino Placido examines the functionality of constitutions by distinguishing between a formal and a material constitution where the former is an "explicit, signed and underwritten pact designed to unify society," while the latter is a "tacit and secret pact which in reality keeps society together."<sup>58</sup> The first term denotes the modern and universalistic nature of the constitution while the second one is the clientelistic influence.

Charged with implementing state policies and in effect holding the state together is the bureaucracy. It is this institution which is placed in the position of carrying out the "formal" or "informal" constitution. Bureaucracies

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<sup>57</sup>Ayata, Clientelism: Premodern, Modern, Postmodern, 19.

<sup>58</sup>Placido, Beniamino, "Articolo 1: Non c'è niente da fare (There is nothing to do) La Repubblica, Rome, 7 August 1984, 1. quoted in Waltson, The Mafia and Clientelism, 22-23.

which take on a style of their national development can range from strictly impersonal and professional as in England to highly influenced by senior politicians and interest group as in the cases of Spain, Greece and Italy.

Unlike the impersonal bureaucracies of France, the United States or Great Britain, the bureaucracies in the Southern European countries especially Italy have been viewed as "offering mobility, and employment to the lower classes that in turn provided votes and a vast patronage network."<sup>59</sup> By not challenging the power of government politicians, state bureaucrats became an instrument of the ruling political class rather than an impartial administration serving the state. Each expansion of the state saw an enlargement of clientelism. State expansion with accompanied clientelism resulted from a bureaucracy that is personal and particular rather than one which is impersonal and universal.

Despite clientelistic practices that were counter to democratic theory, clientelism in western democracies continues to function. In the case of Italy the

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<sup>59</sup>Carlo Rossetti, Constitutionalism and Clientelism in Italy, in Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society, ed. Luis Ronninger and Aysa, Gunes-Ayate, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 89.

proliferation of these policies between the state and the patron evolved into a clientelistic political system which could not be separated from the state.

### **Clientelism and Politics**

Two forms of societal control are through the policies of the state and of the market. Through these two institutions the needs of society should to be met.<sup>60</sup> When the state cannot fulfill this function another institution emerges to organize people to redress the inequalities in society. This is the role of political parties operating within a political system. The political system emerged from civil society, developed its own resource base of legitimacy by integrating subjects politically and developed its own resource of efficiency in the form of a bureaucracy, whereby it was able to carry out the policy of the "center" in the "periphery" of the political system and of civil society.<sup>61</sup>

Political parties are the vehicles by which the system operates. Their function is to serve as the means by which

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<sup>60</sup>Graziano, Center-Periphery Relations, 296.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid. , 296.

resources are allocated and to offer the people "a new kind of identity, a sense of belonging to an imagined community and a potential means of access to power centers."<sup>62</sup> This is accomplished through personal linkages between those of the center and those of the periphery. Thus begins the political clientelistic relationship.

Clientelism has been seen as an essential step in political development. It was the means by which the central authority could be connected with the rural or periphery. It created alliances between those in the capital and the local politicians where each person needed the other for support. It enabled the local actors to moderate the effects of central authority. As the nation-state expanded, those in local office were sought out for access or take off points to the central government. This led to increased competition amongst local elites for delivery of services and benefits to and from the center. With each expansion of the state's institutions and its expansion into the periphery new patron-client relations were established that took on a political nature the most

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<sup>62</sup>Ayata, Clientelism: Premodern, Modern, Postmodern, 5.

often being a jobs in exchange for votes.<sup>63</sup>

In present day societies, clientelism can be based on individuals such as a dictator, through institutions of the state in the case of corrupt regimes often found in developing countries and through political parties. In Italy, political parties have replaced the traditional notable as the patron. Resources are distributed to the local levels of the dominant party through the new patron who is usually a lower middle class politician.<sup>64</sup> These parties operate from a national center and integrate local parties, promote new leadership within themselves and cater to the requests of their base in both particularistic and universalistic methods. They use a pyramid model structure with the electorate composing the largest group at the bottom and party officials the rest.

These parties are large organizations which reach out not only in a political context but also in social activities. The mass party tends to be all encompassing.

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<sup>63</sup>Legg, Patrons, Clients and Politicians, 5.

<sup>64</sup>Maria Caciaglia and Frank P. Belloni, "The New Clientelism in Southern Italy: The Christian Democratic Party in Catania" in Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand, (New York: Sage Publications, 1981), 44-45.

It contains an unorganized lower class group along with certain interests (professors, builders, lawyers) which adds stability to the political system in order to promote the party's own interests and at the same time combat the parties which are not allied with them.<sup>65</sup> Necessary conditions for its survival are the need for a dominant status as a host party, a proportional representation electoral system and the availability of particularistic material rewards. In Italy the emphasis in political clientelism has shifted from control of local resources to control of government resources through the process of machine politics.<sup>66</sup>

The political machine is characterized by the strictly individual and material nature of the rewards it distributes. It has a diverse membership from all walks of life, offers monetary and non-monetary rewards and in the case of the former Christian Democratic party in Italy "intervened directly or indirectly into the workings of the

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<sup>65</sup>Ibid . , 50.

<sup>66</sup>Zuckerman, Political Clienteles in Power, 13.

bureaucratic machinery of the state."<sup>67</sup>

The political machine uses its authority in a clientelistic fashion. This violates the line between the official and private spheres and inhibits the impartial administration of state policy. Within the political machine are the professional politicians who serve as organizers for the party and practice clientelistic politics. These people live off rewards for the services they dispense. These party functionaries act so as to further the career of their leaders and themselves and to control government functions. They act mainly to obtain benefits only for those who are part of their group. If in the rare event they do perform services for those outside the group it is because they perceive a threat to their political clients and to the persistence of the competitive system.<sup>68</sup>

This continuous pursuit of spoils in order to enhance a politician's position and maintain dominance over his or her opponent results in the "total deideologization of the

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<sup>67</sup>Lémarchand, Comparative Political Clientelism, 22.

<sup>68</sup>Zuckerman, Political Clienteles in Power, 14.

party."<sup>69</sup> The mission of the machine is to control the "public treasury and large scale distribution of resources" usually in the form of offering employment or public contracts.<sup>70</sup>

Since the major form of patronage by the machine is through the party boss, the fate of those hired rests on the success of their patrons. This involves working for the candidate after work and doing whatever is necessary to keep him in power.

In democratic politics the usual method of exchange between a patron and a client is through the vote. The election symbolizes the "re-establishment of the redistributive mechanism of the traditional setting."<sup>71</sup> The patron requires the social approval of his community which has enough power to defeat him at the polls. Elections make it necessary for a national party to establish networks and links down to the local level. The

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<sup>69</sup>Graziano, A Conceptual Framework of Clientelism, 163-164.

<sup>70</sup>Judith Chubb, "The Social Base of an Urban Political Machine: The Christian Democratic Party in Palermo" in Political Clientelism Patronage and Development, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand, (New York: Sage Publications, 1981), 70-71.

<sup>71</sup>Scott, Patron-Client Politics, 111.



party does this by incorporating existing client clusters. This means having to reward patrons for their help.<sup>72</sup>

Elections frequently alter the patron client relationship. They temporarily improve a client's bargaining position with a patron. They also serve to promote the vertical integration of patron-client structures from the hamlet to the central government. This leads to the creation of new patron-client pyramids and the politicization of old ones and it contributes to the survival of opposition to patron-client pyramids at the local level.

In order to stay in power the regime must continue to provide rewards at an increasing rate. The result of these exchanges for the vote is a redistribution of income through allocation of pensions, or public works projects which increase government deficits and employment. The vote then is used as the means of exchange whereby "parties distribute selective good specifically designed for narrow groups in anticipation of limited by crucial support."<sup>73</sup> By fostering

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<sup>72</sup>Ibid., 111.

<sup>73</sup>Walston, The Mafia and Clientelism, 19.

expectations of immediate and individual reward, the necessary investments in the general improvement of society cannot be accomplished.

Clientelism has survived through its ability to adapt and integrate itself in changing political, economic and social situations. From 1945 to 1992 the Italian Christian Democratic Party governed Italy and through clientistic practices tied the state and civil society together. This resulted in state interventionist practices continuously influenced by the Christian Democrats with the sole reason of producing private or political gain. These policies crippled Italy's state institutions, hampered industrial development, fostered political and criminal corruption and devastated the economy.

The effects of clientelism in Italy were that a large part of the state became in Graziano's word "privatized." Public resources were distributed according to party or individual criteria, influence at the center (Rome) was reserved for the benefit of individuals or the party rather than the public and political support was won by performing individual favors rather than stated principles or beliefs.

### Clientelism in Italy: 1860-1945

The Risorgimento or National Revival led to the unification of Italy on 25 October 1860. It was accomplished by Piedmontese Prime Minister Count Camillo Benso di Cavour through a series of military victories assisted by Napoleon III, Guiseppe Garibaldi, and Guiseppe Mazzini.<sup>74</sup> Through the use of coercion and persuasion, Cavour convinced Garibaldi to turn over control of the south to King Victor Emmanuel I as a sign of Italian unity. This allowed Cavour to establish Piedmontese control over the entire peninsula and prevent a social revolution led by Garibaldi.

Cavour immediately set out to establish a liberal-democratic state composed of a class of landowners, industrialists and professionals to emerge who would create an entrepreneurial society for the benefit of all. The economic policies and beliefs of the northern political class were adopted. These included the extension of the

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<sup>74</sup>The unification of Italy was brought about by the secret diplomatic arrangement between Cavour and Napoleon III which resulted in hostilities with Austria and the expansion of Piedmont into Lombardy. Concomitant uprisings in the center of the peninsula removed the Dukes of Tuscany, Modena and Parma. By early 1860 the northern provinces annexed themselves to Piedmont. Guiseppe's expedition to Sicily with one thousand men to unify Italy from the south was a rapid success. On 25 October 1860, Garibaldi handed over control of the south to King Victor Emmanuel II, in Teano a town just north of Naples.

Piedmontese Constitution of 1848 to the entire peninsula, elimination of protective tariffs in the south, and the imposition of centralized Piedmontese administration, legal systems and political institutions. Tarrow, Carrello, and Duggan consider the Risorgimento as a movement led by a northern elite who imposed their rules, values, and laws on a formerly fragmented very poor semi-feudal population.<sup>75</sup> To the majority of the people, especially those from the south, the unification of Italy and the imposition of the new policies was seen by the population as "having been conquered by Piedmont."<sup>76</sup> It meant the rule of a small oligarchy, the establishment of a strong centralized state and continuous compromises between the north and the south leading to a dual development of the country.<sup>77</sup>

The oligarchy which ruled the new state was composed of the Liberal party divided into two factions. Cavour's faction, the "Historical Right" was organized around the

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<sup>75</sup>Sidney G. Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 21-24; Adriana Nicola Carello, The Northern Question (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989), 33; Christopher Duggan, A Concise History of England, Cambridge Concise Histories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 135.

<sup>76</sup>Christopher Duggan, A Concise History of England, Cambridge Concise Histories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 135.

<sup>77</sup>P.A. Allum, Italy - Republic Without Government? (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1973), 3.

Piedmontese bourgeoisie and the large landed and professional classes and until 1876 dominated the government. The "Historical Left" as the opposing faction represented opposing gentry and educated urban classes. Due to a restricted suffrage of only 2%, the Liberals were able to represent the upper classes whose differences centered around "their methods and not their ideas."<sup>78</sup> There was no clear basis for a parliamentary majority, votes of confidence or any alternation of government.

The election of 1876 changed the composition of the Parliament. A new electoral law eased property requirements and increased voter participation to 8%. The Historical Left gained 40% of the seats, enabling it to block northern legislation. This allowed the Left which represented to south to block northern legislative proposals. Southern elite demanded more investment and development for their region while industrialists pushed for greater investment and development in the northern regions. The Right

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<sup>78</sup>The unification of Italy was brought about by the secret diplomatic arrangement between Cavour and Napoleon III which resulted in hostilities with Austria and the expansion of Piedmont into Lombardy. Concomitant uprisings in the center of the peninsula removed the Dukes of Tuscany, Modena and Parma. By early 1860 the northern provinces annexed themselves to Piedmont. Guiseppi's expedition to Sicily with one thousand men to unify Italy from the south was a rapid success. On 25 October 1860, Garibaldi handed over control of the south to King Victor Emmanuel II, in Teano a town just north of Naples.

perceived the state's function as "maintaining order and providing infrastructure," while the Left believed the state should act as an "instrument for defending sectional interests."<sup>79</sup>

These diverse differences led to a wide difference between each regions political cultures. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, define political culture as the "pattern of orientations" to political objects such as parties, courts, constitutions, and history of a state.<sup>80</sup> The orientations reflect an individual's or group's tendency towards political action. These predisposition's are determined by such factors as traditions, historical memories, motives, norms, emotions, and symbols.<sup>81</sup>

Political culture in the north centered around liberal democracy and free market economics and a belief that the individual given an equal opportunity would succeed through hard work and personal initiative. The north valued respect for the laws and institutions of the state, fairness,

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<sup>79</sup>Duggan, Concise History of Italy, 158.

<sup>80</sup>Vernon Bogdanor, ed. *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Science* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991), S.v.G.A. Almond and S. Verba eds.: *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) in "Political Culture" by Dennis Kavanagh, 447.

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.*, 447.

equality and stability. The south's attitudes were markedly different than their northern neighbors. The ruling elite southern gentry were an aristocratic class who wanted to maintain their exclusive power and privileges and were opposed to sharing power with the lower classes. They were authoritarian in nature and governed by personal rather than institutional power. There was no uniform code of law, justice or administration that was applied equally to all. It was incumbent upon each individual to align themselves with a patron in order to be able to exist in the society.

After 1876 a new arrangement which combined the interests of both groups developed. This agreement allowed for modernization and industrialization in the north while the status quo remained in the south. For its loyalty the south was rewarded with public works projects which allowed deputies and other notables to offer patronage in the form of jobs or titles. This process known as "trasformismo" (transformation) enabled the government to pursue its free market industrial policies in the north, while in the south the ruling classes would remain in power and not have to give up their privileges.

The limited number of people voting resulted in

political life centering on cliques and faction built around a powerful individual (notable) and his following. These associations were loosely knit, encompassed both the left and the right and had to be reformulated for each new bill.<sup>82</sup> This system was drafted by the ruling elite as an attempt to slowdown or stop completely the spread of radicalism among northern workers. A series of prime ministers supported these moves and were able to successfully manage class conflict either through co-optation or isolation.

Southern development was delayed since the south gave up any demands for implementation of a national policy for the region. The south, by providing unquestioning support to the north maintained the status quo in its region, exercised completed freedom of action in local administration and obtained access to government patronage. Political practice, especially in the south, became associated with personal clienteles. These personal and instrumental associations resulted in delaying the development of class based parties.

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<sup>82</sup>Judith Chubb, Patronage, Power and Poverty in Southern Italy, A Tale of Two Cities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 19-20; Furlong, Modern Italy, 38-39.



Accompanying trasformismo were clientelistic networks established with the power to hand out patronage jobs and increased public works projects. These networks stretched from the local notable to the government ministers. The deputy was the key figure in this chain. Through the deputy, arguments were made on behalf of local supporters to governmental ministers. Ministers had a wide discretion on how to distribute funds and would allocate resources to the deputies who supported the government. The continuing practice of trasformismo and allocation of resources based on clientelistic relationships "transformed the state into an immense spoils system" and "increased the power of the south without helping it modernize."<sup>83</sup>

Northern economic policies imposed on the south via trasformismo led to the creation of a dual economy. In order to protect northern industries, the new state: (1) eliminated high tariffs in the south, thereby effectively destroying their fledgling manufacturing industry in Naples, (2) imposed a uniform tax and tariff policy which drained resources in the south to fund northern investment, (3)

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<sup>83</sup>Graziano, Center-Periphery Relations, 306.

southern industry by draining reserves of precious metals from the south's banking system, and (5) imposed agricultural policies that oriented the south's products for the external and more vulnerable markets in order to protect northern markets.<sup>84</sup>

These policies enacted by the north and agreed to by the southern elite comprised what Gramsci identified as a historic alliance between the northern industrial bourgeoisie and southern landed bourgeois. By leaving the economic and political control of the southern socio-economic system in the hands of the big latifundists, the northern industrialists assured themselves of an intensive and rapid modernization and industrialization program. Concurrently in the south, a powerful conservative and parasitic wealthy landowning class was able to resist all attempts at land reform or industrialization by keeping the peasant population under its tight political and economic control.<sup>85</sup>

This destroyed any idea of southern development, for

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<sup>84</sup>Carello, The Northern Question, 25-37; Chubb, Patronage, Power and Poverty in Southern Italy, 16.

<sup>85</sup>Leonardo Salamini, "Italian Underdevelopment in the Post-War Period: Some Observations on State Policies and the Mafia" International Journal of Contemporary Sociology 29 (October 1992): 203.

control.<sup>85</sup>

This destroyed any idea of southern development, for the region could not be modernized without dismantling the large farms and properties. The historic agreements that Gramsci referred to and the practice of trasformismo in parliament eliminated the emergence of political groups that sought improvements for the south.

With the process of trasformismo stifling any political party movement, political organization was built on the clientelistic system of trading favors. In the north political activity and organization was based on economic and social groups thereby providing a "continuous struggle of organized and organizing class interests and groups."<sup>86</sup>

Southern political power centered around the local notable. Certain delegated powers to the local communes were controlled by the local elite and their supporters. Most legal functions centered around the narrow circle of notables who controlled the city hall. The notables, fearful of their position also made alliances with the

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<sup>85</sup>Leonardo Salamini, "Italian Underdevelopment in the Post-War Period: Some Observations on State Policies and the Mafia" International Journal of Contemporary Sociology 29 (October 1992) : 203.

<sup>86</sup>Allum, Italy-Republic Without Government?, 22.

Mafia. These actions presented the general population and especially the peasants with no legal recourse for appeal of decisions. "Compliance or collective violence" was their only alternative.<sup>87</sup>

Control of local government became a contested position due to its ability to hand out patronage. Elections were won by those who "controlled government and patronage." The deputy was the delegate of the dominant local clientele. Usually a member of the petty bourgeoisie, the individual often a lawyer served as an intermediary between the peasant and the landlord. This position became institutionalized and mediators emerged as strong individuals who employed bribes, special competence or personal influence in relation with the state.<sup>88</sup>

The effects of clientelism and trasformismo devastated the south. Throughout the Liberal era, appalling social conditions existed in the south. Peasants spent seventy-five percent of their income on food. The other twenty-five percent went to shelter and clothing. Wheat production was

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<sup>87</sup>Chubb, The Poverty of Southern Italy, 22.

<sup>88</sup>Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Italy, 26-27.

low, capital to buy manufactured goods was limited and most payment was in barter.<sup>89</sup> These conditions did not improve over time. The economic gap between north and south increased rapidly after 1900, as northern industry became more productive. The gap between north and south in per capita income was about 15-25% in the north's favor and by 1928 it reached 40%.<sup>90</sup>

In 1950 the South was over populated, lacked infrastructure and manufacturing, and had an agricultural system geared toward the needs of local markets. Thirty-seven percent of the population resided in the Mezzogiorno.<sup>91</sup> The distribution of per capita income based on a scale of 100 showed the south at 58.2% and the north at 126%. Table 1, pg. 83, makes a comparison of per capita income between the North and South for the years 1928 and 1951. Most of the south was employed in agriculture and only 15% of industrial investment and 20% of industrial

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<sup>89</sup>Duggan, Concise History of Italy, 146-149.

<sup>90</sup>Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy, 26-27.

<sup>91</sup>The word Mezzogiorno literally means 12pm or noon. It is used when referring to the whole southern region. This term is used as an analogy to describe the intense sun and heat in the region.

employment was located in the south.<sup>92</sup> These deteriorating conditions resulted in three land reform acts and the establishment of a fund placing the state as overseer and assisting in the modernization and industrialization of the South.

This aggressive leap into revitalizing the south was opposed on two fronts by Finance Minister Luigi Einaudi who viewed the role of the state as non interference and the northern industrialists who felt the south's development and production would hurt their chances in foreign markets.

Table 1, pg. 63 list the comparative per capita incomes in 1983 Lire. In order to accommodate the north's demands and address the southern problem a policy was adapted to implement a series of public works projects instead of industry in the depressed areas of the south. Table 1, pg. 65 shows the Comparative per Capita Incomes in 1938 Lire.

#### **Clientelism in Southern Development**

The Cassa per IL Mezzogiorno (Fund for the Development of the South) was designed by the DC as an extensive public works program in the rural areas. During its first eight

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<sup>92</sup>Carello, The Northern Question, 51.

Table 1

## Comparative Per Capita Incomes in 1938 Lire

Region and Area	Per Capita Income		Change Percent	Ratio of area per capita income to north Average for entire north	
	1928	1951		1928	1951
South:				Percent	
Calabria	1554	1434	-7.7	50.7	40.5
Basilicata	1751	1489	-15	57.1	42.1
North:					
Piedmont,					
Val d'Aosta	4071	4151	2	132.8	117.4
Lombardy	3717	4719	26.9	121.3	133.4
Liguria	3784	4353	15	123.4	123.1

Source: Statisticle Sul Mezzogiorno d'Italia, 1861-1953, p. 12. Excerpted from George Heldebrond, Growth & Structure in the Economy of Modern Italy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, 293.

years, it pursued a policy of preindustrialization aimed at building an infrastructure base through massive public works projects, land irrigation and cultivation. The second phase from 1958-1965 concentrated on direct stimulation of industrialization through financial incentives for private companies.<sup>93</sup> State investment in

<sup>93</sup>Salamini, Italian Underdevelopment in Post-War Period, 206-207.

industrialized areas known as "poles of development" located in coastal cities intended to reduce migration from the farms. It proved unsuccessful and increased poverty in the agricultural inland areas.<sup>94</sup>

The Cassa located plants such as steel works in Taranto and in northern Naples, petro chemicals in Gela, an Alfa-Romeo plant in Naples, chemical works in Brindisi and a Fiat plant in Sicily. Primarily capital intensive rather than labor intensive, they had a limited impact on stimulating the economy around them. The high unemployment rate in Naples did not drop significantly since much of the labor came from surrounding areas.

The Cassa made some inroads in integrating the southern economy with the rest of Italy. Between 1957 and 1974 the proportion of the labor force engaged in agriculture declined from 57% to 24%. Per capita income grew 150% from 1950-1970. In spite of those advances, by 1975 per capita income in the south stood at 50% of the north and economic dualism still persisted.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>94</sup>Chubb, Poverty in Southern Italy, 30-31.

<sup>95</sup>Salamini, Italian Underdevelopment in Post-War Period, 206.



Chubb describes these conditions as "industrialization without development," and views them as an attempt by the DC to undermine their political opposition by investment while at the same time preserving in large part the traditional economic and social structure of the south upon which the DC's clientelistic power bases depended.<sup>96</sup>

In 1986 the Cassa was replaced by a more decentralized system under the Ministry for the Mezzogiorno. Its critics pointed to its: (1) concentration of capital intensive industries rather than labor, (2) most firms did not trigger a support economy, (3) most firms were subsidiaries of northern companies artificially implanted in the south to get state subsidies with no real linkages to the economy, (4) control of plants in the hands of outsiders and production geared to the external market, and (5) "no clear-cut priorities and coordination among projects because of no coherent national industrial policy."<sup>97</sup> This created an ad hoc haphazard intervention often determined more by political pressure than by the

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<sup>96</sup>Chubb, Poverty in Southern Italy, 33.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid. , 31-32.

criteria of economic rationality. Its original purpose became a political bandwagon for the maintenance of clientele. The chief beneficiaries from these projects were local politicians and northern industry which supplied the equipment.

A new dominant political class emerged composed of Christian Democrat party members loyal to party bosses, bureaucrats, building speculators and lawyers who received funds from the central government and mediated between the state and local communities. They replaced the old landed notables and were dependent for their power on local government, special agencies of the state and the party leaders who controlled the flow of the Cassa's spending.

The biggest failure of the Cassa was the insufficient creation of new jobs in the industrial and service sectors to absorb the massive outflow of labor from agriculture and its inability to stimulate an autonomous, balanced and self-sustaining process of industrialization in the south.

Despite the enormous growth in Italy since WWII and becoming the world's fifth economy the South today still trails the North. In the early 1990's southern unemployment was 20% compared to 6% in the north. Incomes

are 60% of the North's and the south consumes most of the state welfare in the form of employment support, pensions and disabilities. The south by all estimates still ranks alongside the regions of Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Its per capita gross domestic product ranks at 85% of the European Union average while in the north it is 115%.<sup>98</sup> Selected indicators of living standards in different areas of the country are contained in Table 2, pg. 70. Efforts at southern development during the turn of the century and after WWII proved unable to correct the north-south imbalance.

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<sup>98</sup>Hine, Governing Italy, 62.

Table 2

## Selected Indicators of Living Standards

	Unemployment rate by percent	General index of quality of life Italy=100	GDP per capita Italy=100	Murders per 100K inhabitants	
Northwest	5.4	110	126	0.9	
Northeast	4.8	119	117	0.7	
Centre	9.9	108	111	1.3	
South	19.7	82	67	6.1	100
Italy	11	100	100	2.9	

Source: S. Gattei, "Qualita della vita nelle regione meridionali e divario rispetto al Centro-Nord' Rivista economica del Mezzogiorno 5(1991). Quality of life in the southern regions and the difference in the Central-North regions. Economic Journal of the South. Excerpted from V. Zamagni, The Economic History of Italy, 1990.

## Chapter 3

### THE POLITICS OF ITALY

The end of the Cold War has brought about a major change in the Italian political system. Over the course of two national elections in 1992 and 1994, the established political parties that ruled Italy since the end of WWII are no longer in power. These parties were dissolved and reemerged with new names and different platforms.<sup>99</sup> In order to understand the significance of these events, it is useful to review the background of the Italian political parties since WWII and the dominant role they played in Italy's post-war development.

The origins of the present Italian political parties are rooted in the 1943-1945 resistance movement. Freedom fighters known as partisans performed acts of sabotage and commando raids on German and Italian Fascist troops in non Allied liberated areas. The Italian Communist Party (PCI), The Italian Socialist Party (PSI), and the Action Party

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<sup>99</sup>The Christian Democrats became the Italian Popular Party in January 1994, the Italian Communist Party became the Democratic Party of the Left in 1991, and the Italian Social Movement became the National Alliance in 1994.

played the largest role.<sup>100</sup>

In September 1943 the resistance groups united under the umbrella organization of the Committee of National Liberation (CLN). They quickly gained control of the Italian government by the overwhelming support they enjoyed amongst the people, their control of military operations in the North and at that time close relations with the Allies. The CLN overshadowed Italian King Victor Emmanuel II and Chief of Staff of the Italian Armed Forces Marshall Pietro Badoglio. It forced them to accept its policies and in reality the CLN ran the government from behind the scenes.

On 2 June 1946 elections were held for a constituent assembly and a referendum on abolishing the monarchy was approved. A democratic republic was approved and established. The new republic instituted a strong parliament with a weak executive, large mass political parties and universal suffrage for all citizens over eighteen. These actions signified the end of any connection

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<sup>100</sup>The Action Party was formed in 1942 and was named after Guisseppi Mazzini's party of the Risorgimento. It was composed of groups of radicals and anti-Facists from the professional classes.

with the old Liberal regime.<sup>101</sup>

The resistance groups converted their military successes into political gains by transforming their military organizations and influence in the newly liberated zones into the basis of modern day mass political parties. Displaying an unusual show of unity and dedication to the principles of democracy and anti-Fascism, the Italian Communist Party and Italian Socialist Party and a growing Christian Democrat Party emerged from the war as the leaders of a six party coalition post-war government which governed until the 1948 general election. PCI leader Palmiro Togliatti pledged the party would follow democratic principles and respect the fundamentals of democracy and multiple party rule. This cooperation enabled the PCI to play an active role in the post war recovery, gain respect and legitimacy and convert from a secret and clandestine Leninist party to an open mass party.

The first post-war government worked on reunifying the country, settling war issues and economic recovery. Trying

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<sup>101</sup>The election results to the constituent assembly were as follows. CD 35.2% with 207 seats; PSI 20.7% with 115 seats and PCI 19% with 104 seats. Other minor parties made up the rest. The vote on abolishing the monarch and establishing a republic was 54.2% for and 45.8% against the proposal.

to make the post-war recovery as smooth as possible the government allowed Fascist state structures in the areas of law, economy and bureaucracy to remain intact with few retributions taken against former Fascists. The need to proceed quickly with the recovery united the major parties on all initial political programs.

As the new provisional government began its task of reconstructing Italy, the dominant role of political parties became immediately evident. Elections to the constituent assembly which wrote the constitution were under party banners. The PCI, PSI and DC dominated the assembly. Working together they created a document that contained Liberal, Catholic and Marxist doctrines in an uneasy alliance. It established a polity based on the principles of parliamentary democracy, universal adult suffrage, civil rights, legal protection and extensive decentralization of the highly unitary state. A balance was struck between the right to own property and develop it and the need to protect society from the abuses of private property. The issue of separation between Church and State was solved by Togliatti's proposal that the Lateran Treaty not be included in the constitution and the Italian state promised not to



revise the Concordat unilaterally.

Separation of powers were reinforced with a stronger system of checks and balances in order to control abuses by any one branch against the other. An independent judiciary was established with powers to investigate and adjudicate. Most significant was the electoral system selected. The large number of parties required a proportional representation system that could ensure fair representation. This system allowed parties to enter Parliament with as little as 1.6% of the vote. Many parties gained seats and no one party received enough votes to govern alone. Parties formed coalitions to govern and at any time had the power to collapse a government and cause a political crisis.

Political parties emerged from the war as the strongest institutions of the post-war state. Through the parties Italian society was restructured and placed on the path of recovery. The DC and PCI represented two diametrically opposed views on the method of the recovery. The DC favored employers and supported United States foreign policy goals while the PCI supported programs benefiting the working class and a foreign policy siding with the USSR.

Despite the DC and PCI's differences each party was not

strong enough to govern alone and had to compromise. To maintain the alliance, the PCI abandoned its goal of revolutionary struggle and focused on winning popular support and power through acceptance of its ideas by following Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony.<sup>102</sup> The DC and its many Catholic supporters insisted Christian principles be implemented for everyone. Economic and social policies were geared more towards business but were tempered by moderate wage increases well below the inflation and productivity rate.<sup>103</sup> In spite of some concessions to the workers the post war recovery policy was based on a free market system oriented towards rebuilding northern industry, keeping wages low, concentrating on industrial development and manufacturing products for the export market.

Throughout this period, the Cold War polarized politics between East and West. Intense pressure was applied to Prime Minister and DC leader Alcide De Gaspari from the

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<sup>102</sup>Gramsci's concept of Hegemony: Party gradually penetrated all aspects of Italian social and cultural life. Once this is accomplished, the state would naturally fall into the PCI's hands by virtue of its acceptance by the society.

<sup>103</sup>The free market economic policies pursued by Italy came at a high cost. In 1947 there were 1.7 million people unemployed, conditions of mass hunger in many parts of the South and a lack of infrastructure and services. In spite of these difficult economic and social conditions the PCI did not establish workers councils or any other Leninist tactics. For more on this subject see Ginsbourg, 79-81.

Allies and the Church to expel the PCI from government. In May 1947 after returning from a visit to the United States he dissolved his government and formed a center-right government of the DC, Italian Social Democrat Party (PSDI), Italian Liberal Party (PLI), and the Italian Republican Party (PRI). This marked the last time the PCI was in power and set the stage for the future of Italian politics that placed the DC as the dominant party in a coalition government and the PCI in permanent opposition.

The election of 1948, the first under the new constitution and Italy's most important election determined whether Italy would be either in the western (US) or eastern (USSR) sphere of influence. The highly emotional campaign between the DC and the PCI was an ideological battle fought over the values of Western Democracy or USSR style Socialism. Each side was heavily funded by the US and USSR.<sup>104</sup> Shortly before the election a Communist inspired coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia occurred which had a negative impact on the PCI and cost them crucial votes. The DC won the election with 48.5% of the vote and an absolute majority

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<sup>104</sup>The US assisted De Gaspari by expediting aid under the Marshall Plan, helping Italy get inflation under control, encouraging the Italo-Community to send money to help the DC, returning Trieste to Italy and heavy lobbying by the Catholic Church.

of 305 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The Popular Front of the PCI/PSI received 31%. The PCI received more votes than the PSI and became the main party of the leftist opposition, the second largest party in Italy and the permanent opponent of the DC.

Despite its absolute majority, the DC formed a coalition government with the PRI, PLI and PSDI.<sup>105</sup> This set the precedent of establishing governments with the maximum number of parties based on their loyalty to the constitution, not party and excluding the PCI from power. Those outside the government were portrayed as not fully supportive of the constitution. Permanently anchored in the Western sphere of political relationships, Italy later joined NATO in 1949, the EEC in 1957 and pursued free market economic policies. The 1948 election validated the expulsion of the PCI from government and solidified the political structure so that the "DC was always in power and the PCI always in opposition."<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>105</sup>The PSDI broke away from the PSI due to its leader Guiseppi Saragat's refusal to cooperate with the PCI.

<sup>106</sup>Martin Jacques, "The Godmother: Italy's Meltdown and Ours," The New Republic, 20 September 1993, 23.

## The Italian Political System Since 1948

James Walston, Martin Bull and Roberto Leonardi consider political parties as the dominant element in post-war politics.<sup>107</sup> This period in contradistinction to the Liberal regime saw the rise of mass parties of which the DC and PCI were the largest. They aimed at advancing the interests of specific social categories in the population such as Catholics or the working class. To attract members and expand their membership they established ancillary organizations and other operations designed to further integrate individuals into party activity such as youth groups, clubs, trade and farm organizations and newspapers. The parties served as the main actors in mobilizing opinion and voicing the interests of individual regions.

The political structure centered around the DC and its coalition partners the PRI, PLI and the PSDI and after 1963 the PSI in coalition in order to exclude the PCI from power. This power provided predictability and long term stability

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<sup>107</sup>Walston, J. The Mafia and Clientelism, 52-53; Roberto Leonardi, Democratic Transition in Post-War Italy," In Encouraging Democracy. The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe ed. Geoffrey Pridham (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) , 19; Martin Bull and James L. Newell, "Italian Politics and the 1992 Elections: From Stable Instability to Instability and Change, Parliamentary Affairs 47 (April 1993) : 205.

while parties would foster inter-coalition rivalry and government instability.<sup>108</sup> Minor parties formed alliances with the DC to gain access to power and patronage. The Center parties of the DC, PRI, PLI and PSDI maintained an understanding that despite minor squabbling and frequent changes of government, they would remain in power thereby creating a "blocked" system of no alternation whereby the same governing group retained power in order to exclude the PCI.<sup>109</sup>

In 1963 DC Prime Minister Aldo Moro made a bold move and invited the PSI into government. This first "opening to the left" increased the scope of the coalition and allowed the PSI to extend its power and clientelistic base through its participation in the spoils system.<sup>110</sup> The second opening to the left was the Historic Compromise made with the PCI from 1976-1978 which offered the party some representation in state run companies and patronage in

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<sup>108</sup>This inter-coalition rivalry and government instability was due to government parties creating political crises in order to improve their position in the cabinet.

<sup>109</sup>Leonard Weinberg, *The Transformation of Italian Communism* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 115.

<sup>110</sup>Sacco, *Italy After Communism*, 32.

return for its support of the government.

Two views explaining the Italian political system are offered by Giovanni Sartori, and Giorgio Galli. Sartori's theory of polarized pluralism applies to the 1950s and 1960s prior to the DC's accommodation with the PCI. His model states that Italy has a plurality of parties represented in Parliament that govern and the anti-system or extreme parties (the poles), represented by the PCI and neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI). There is intense disagreement amongst the parties and no one is able to win an overall majority. This guarantees the continuation in power of the largest of the center parties; DC and PSI; the formation of coalitions with other parties for purely tactical reasons to remain in power; no true alternation in government; no accountability to the people; and no modification of extreme parties positions. Smaller parties in government would take extreme positions which he calls "outbidding" to keep their identity from being overshadowed by larger parties and precipitate a governmental crisis order to get a better deal. Since they all "flee from the center" in a centrifugal manner, an unstable situation is

created which requires constant negotiations and compromises.<sup>111</sup>

To maintain a viable political system De Gaspari formulated the tripolar party system which pitted the neo-Fascist MSI on the far right, the DC, PRI, PLI in the center-right, the PSDI in the center-left and the PCI/PSI on the left. The strategy painted the three extreme parties as poles which then allowed the DC to occupy the center. Wanting at all costs to avoid a bi-polar or two party system which would have allowed the PCI to gain power, the DC always looked to enter into coalition.<sup>112</sup> In the coalition it usually controlled about 60% of the vote and ruled out any chance of alternation. This produced platforms reflecting the dealings of party leaders who made compromises and decisions on behalf of their clients in private with officials of government status.

Giorgio Galli's theory of "imperfect bipartisan" argues that political participation is dominated by two parties the

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<sup>111</sup>Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in *Political Parties and Political Development* ed. Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 137-136.

<sup>112</sup>Mark Donovan, "Party Strategy and Centre Domination in Italy," *West European Politics* 12 (October 1989): 116.



DC and PCI and not by many parties of equal strength as Sartori argues. Between 1948-1992, these two parties gained over 60% of the vote. He observes that the DC and PCI maintained their control through "subcultures" of large complex networks of social organizations in certain regions that encompassed a large proportion of the population.<sup>113</sup> These areas served as a source of strength and stability for the parties well into the 1980's. Within these regions both parties had to appeal to similar socio-economic groups which were primarily modern agricultural sectors and profitable small industry. Galli counters Sartori's argument of outbidding and centrifugality by predicting convergence and centripetality.<sup>114</sup>

Despite their two divergent views on how the political system operates, both Sartori and Galli point to the instability of the political system. The frequent changes of governments, led people to believe that the system was unstable. The various government crises and reshuffling of

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<sup>113</sup>G. Galli and A. Pruned, Pattern of Political Participation in Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) in Furlong *Modern Italy*, 146-151. The 'subculture' regions are the Veneto for the DC and the regions of Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany for the PCI.

<sup>114</sup>Paolo Forneti used the term centripetal when describing how political parties move towards the center. See Paolo Forneti, The Italian Party System (New York: St Martin's Press, 1985), 181-190.

cabinets served as a safety valve for a blocked system. These crises accommodated changes in the strength of political parties and the groups supporting them and permitted some change of politicians. Proportional representation determined how much power, ministerial positions and patronage each party received. Patronage and party affiliation became the sole basis for employment, not knowledge or competence. This allocation system known as lottizzazione became the lifeblood of the political system and provided political stability and tranquillity that ensured the DC always remained in power.

Party leaders supervised lottizzazione. They appointed cabinet ministers, agreed to governmental policies and handled political crises instead of the government or parliament. Loyalty was the guiding principle in Italian politics and it went first to the party or faction and not to the state.<sup>115</sup> Party leader selected Members of Parliament (MP) through the use of the recently discarded preference vote. They chose whom they wanted in Parliament and were not bound by the voters selections. This forced every MP to

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<sup>115</sup>Leonardi, Democratic Transition in Postwar Italy, 23-25.

support the party in spite of their constituents moods or their own if they wanted to remain in politics. In the case of the PCI, party control of the MP was so total that their MP's gave their government paychecks to the party for a PCI paycheck.<sup>116</sup>

Political party domination extended not only into the political sphere but also into the state and civil society. Through the expansion of the public sector, and a vast number of political appointments in all levels of state run corporations a social stratum was created dependent on politics clientelism that produced expectations and behaviors conforming to party desires that Sidoti termed "Hyper-Politicization."<sup>117</sup> These parties served as patrons to individuals whose jobs were dependent on their remaining in power. The parties were able to politicize almost all public institutions by the promise of employment to their clients and the state disappeared as the seat of rational

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<sup>116</sup>Angelo Codevilla, "A Second Italian Republic," *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Summer 1992) : 146-147. The PCI was a more rigid organization and uses the paycheck as a means of employing more discipline and not allowing MP's to form alliances with interest groups.

<sup>117</sup>Francesco Sidoti, "Italy: A Clean-Up After the Cold War," *Government and Opposition* 28 (Winter 1993) : 107.

and impartial powers.<sup>118</sup>

The dominance of political parties transformed Italy into a party state or "partitocrazia" where parties ruled instead of the people. This resulted in real power being held by the parties not the government. The parties became vast and bloated, had enormous resources, a large clientistic network to distribute patronage and developed an extremely unhealthy relationship between government, the state, business and civil society.

The DC built its power base on a clientelistic structure and created a party organization closely intertwined with the "state and primed with public money."<sup>119</sup> The usual method of clientelistic exchange centered around employment in return for votes. De Gaspari fully aware of the methods the DC used to keep power curtly responded to the criticism by saying: "I build with the bricks I have."<sup>120</sup>

DC domination of the political scene lay in its ability to control key ministries. Without interruption from 1948-

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<sup>118</sup>Robert Leonardi and Douglas A. Wertman, Italian Christian Democracy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 24.

<sup>119</sup>Duggan, A Concise History of Italy, 255-256.

<sup>120</sup>Quoted in Guiseppe Sacco, "Italy After Communism," The Washington Quarterly 15 (Summer 1992): 29.

1990 the DC held Interior, Education, Agriculture and Posts ministries. Foreign Affairs and Treasury were held almost continuously.<sup>121</sup> It employed a divide and rule strategy in which it kept the key patronage and status posts while distributing the other posts to coalition partners for barter. The percentage that each party occupied the ministries and the categorization of each ministry as to either its patronage, political, prestigious or dependency value are given in Table 3, pg. 88. This system held together until the 1980s when the DC lost the Prime Ministers seat for the first time due to a decrease in its electoral strength. Throughout its tenure in government the DC had one of its own as either a minister or under-secretary in each ministry. Access to ministerial posts was controlled by party or faction leaders who used these offices to reward clients.

Cabinets were constructed by negotiation between the Prime Minister designate, leaders of government parties, and factional leaders. These negotiations required the participants to agree to a "weight" for the posts available

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<sup>121</sup>Furlong, Modern Italy, 119-120.

Table 3

## Categorization of Ministries

Categorization of Ministries			
Group A	Group B	Group C	Group D
Status	Politics	Patronage	Dependence
Foreign Affairs	Budget	Agriculture	Culture
Interior	Defense	Education	Environment
Treasury	Finance*	Health	Foreign Trade*
	Industry*	Merchant Marine	Tourism
	Justice*	Posts and Telecommunications wp*	
	Labor	Public Works	Civil Defense
		Southern Development	EC Policy
		State Participation	Parliamentary Relations
		Transportation	*Public Administration
			Regional Affairs
			Science Research
			Families

\* Ministries with exceptional administrative content

Note: wp without portfolio

Source: Modern Italy. Representation and Reform, Paul Furlong, 117.

Table 4, pg. 89 shows the occupation of the top 20 ministries, 1945-1992, as percentage of total period.

Table 4

## Occupation of the Top 20 Ministries 1945-1992

	DC	PSI	PSDI	PRI	PLI	IND	OTHER
Foreign Affairs	82.7	2.9	5.2	8.4	2.2	0	0
Interior	97.5	1.4	0	0	0	0	1.1
Treasury	81.9	4.5	3	2	8.5	0	0
Budget	57.9	18.9	9.6	11.3	2.4	0	0
Defense	54.8	8.3	8.8	19.3	5.8	2.3	0.7
Finance	60.8	8.3	12.3	11.5	0	3.3	3.8
Justice	75.1	8.1	0	7.2	3.9	1.1	4.6
Industry	70.8	3.7	4.9	4.7	15.5	0.7	0
Labor	66.1	16	17.2	0	0	0.7	0
Agriculture	97.5	0	0	0	0	0	2.5
Education	90.1	0	3.7	0.9	2.8	1.1	1.3
Health	67.3	23.5	0	0	9.1	0	0
Merchant Marine	82.8	3.6	6.4	4.7	0	2.5	0
Posts and Telecom.	90.7	0.7	3.1	4.5	0	1	0
Southern Dev.	81.9	12.1	5.9	0	0	0	0
Public Works	47.2	22.1	20.4	5.2	1.4	3	0.7
Transport	66.4	22.6	22.6	6.1	2.4	0.7	3.8
Culture	72.9	0	0	11.6	0	0	0

Percentages refer to the total period which the ministry has formally been in existence since June 1945.

Source: Modern Italy. Representation and Reform, Paul Furlong, 123.

and to distribute them in accordance with the prevailing

distribution of power between the factions.<sup>122</sup>

Furlong considers the appointments of ministers to cabinet posts as the market is to the law of supply and demand. The minister acts as a selling agent by controlling the flow of the primary product that is access to public resources. The political parties serve as the brokers who are able to put the patron and the client together and control the rate of exchange.<sup>123</sup> Often times ministers deal directly with clients so they can be in a more powerful position without the influence of party leaders. These transactions are usually on a barter system in which the minister will offer a public resource such as a license to build or public contracts to a client for a particular objective such as votes or money.

A key factor in ministerial selection lay in the strength of the candidate's faction. In each party, factions act as competitive units that contend within the

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<sup>122</sup>This "weight" referred to the cabinet position relative to its prestige or patronage. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was considered prestigious while the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs was sought after for the amount of patronage. Ministers were assigned to these ministries based on their strength in the party. See Furlong, Modern Italy, 122-123.

<sup>123</sup>Furlong, Modern Italy, 111. This weight is determined by the % of the vote the party has, and the importance of that particular ministry.



party to set policy, strategy and thereby control the formation of the coalition. Agreement amongst factions is necessary for a coalition's survival and its dissolution is usually the result of factional disagreement. Faction leaders compete for leadership positions and as a group name party candidates for elective or appointive office and hand out patronage jobs. Factions may be based on ideological agreement as to public policies, the geographic origins and location of those who make up the faction or major personalities in the patron-client relationship. Usually they are driven by a quest for power.

In the Italian political system the DC had the largest number of factions (6) which were based on individual personalities and ideological differences.<sup>124</sup> Factions served as conduits for various interest groups to obtain access. They controlled lottizzazione and allowed like minded people of several different parties to work together

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<sup>124</sup> In the 1980's the DC had up to six factions composed of factions based on ideological differences (the left, center and new force) and 3 based on personal loyalties (Forlani, Fanfaniani and Andreottiani). See Leonardi Italian Christian Democracy, 94. According to Germino and Pasquino, Government and Politics of Contemporary Italy, the PCI was split by ideological faction between the supporters of left wing Pietro Ingrao and right wing Giorgio Amendola. The PSI was fractionalized strictly for personal reasons while the DC was split along personal and ideological lines.

by easing the way for policy proposals.<sup>125</sup>

Since factions provided access to government, clientelism relied on them to function. This network began at the local level and extended throughout the nation. Faction leaders controlled the passage of clientelism between levels of national and local government. This system functioned quite well for the DC until the beginning of the corruption scandals in early February 1992.

The April 1992 election marked the end of the DC dominated political system. The traditional coalitions lost credibility and support due to the exposure of corruption, mismanagement, clientelism, the rise of organized crime, and the inability to provide an alternative to the electorate. This resulted in a corrupt and bloated political system that could not offer the country any clear vision of the future.

#### **Parties and State Institutions**

**The legislature.** The Italian Constitution established a liberal democracy placing Parliament at the core of the political process. Parliament was granted considerable power and its ability to counter a powerful executive is the

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<sup>125</sup>LaPalombara, Democracy Italian Style, 124.

most effective in all of Western Europe. It is composed of two equal houses, the lower body, the Chamber of Deputies with 630 members and the upper body Senate with 315 members.<sup>126</sup> They perform identical functions in carrying out their roles of control over the executive, legislation and representation.

Its formal powers include complete sovereignty over legislation, control of the legislative agenda, the secret ballot, and no government veto over legislation. Executive oversight is exercised by the motion of a no confidence vote, the secret ballot and committee hearings.<sup>127</sup> Parliament can enact minor legislation with just a committee vote and citizens can propose legislation and sponsor referendums.<sup>128</sup> Besides its constitutional powers,

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<sup>126</sup>In the Chamber of Deputies there is one MP for every 80,000 people. Suffrage to this body is open to all citizens over 18 years. The Senate has 1 senator for every 160,000 people. Suffrage to this body is open to all citizens over 25 years.

<sup>127</sup>The no confidence vote is the test of the government's support. If the government fails to vote it must resign and a new one is formed or elections are held. The secret vote is designed to allow MP's to vote their desires without party retribution. This is a method by which factions within the governing coalition express their displeasure.

<sup>128</sup>Legislation by committee is allowed unless the government object or 10% of the respective House from which the legislation originated objects of if 20% of the committee proposing the legislation objects. Citizens are allowed to propose legislation with 50,000 signatures. Referendums are allowed either to abrogate in whole or a part of a law. For a referendum to pass it must have at least a 50% turnout and 50% approval. Referendums are prohibited on tax issues, budget amnesties, pardons and treaties. The current Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Iva Pivetti is a 31 year old first term who represents the Northern League. For additional information Germino and Passigili, Politics of Contemporary Italy, 50-51.

Parliament also functions as a body to voice individual grievances, represent special interests, deliberate policies and serve as a training ground for future leaders. Within this realm, the political parties play a key role in policy formation and ministerial selection.

Pasquino notes that the ability of external groups to influence the decision making process is mediated by the parties. Laws or special acts designed to help an individual group are the result of negotiation between the parties and the groups rather than a Member of Parliament (MP) submitting it in the legislature. Parties determine what laws will be transmitted to their own parliamentary groups for action.<sup>129</sup> Government ministerial selection is controlled by the party and ministers are almost always selected from Parliament with the exception of a technocratic government.<sup>130</sup>

Parliamentary service is a pre-requisite for future

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<sup>129</sup>Gianfranco Pasquino, "Unregulated Regulators: Parties and Government," in State, Market and Social Regulations: New Perspectives on Italy, ed. Suzanne Berger, Alberto Heischman, Charles Maier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 35.

<sup>130</sup>The first technocratic government was led by Carlo Chiampi former President of the Bank of Italy from April 1993 to May 1994. Presently there is a technocratic government in power led by Lambertino Dino since January 1995 also a past President of the Bank of Italy. Elections are tentatively scheduled for October 1995.

ministers. Ministers are appointed according to their power in the party. This is based largely on the preference vote which indicates the strength of their power base. Ministerial selection allows an individual to extend his or her clientelistic power base through increased control of public resources. To maintain their power bases, ministers and MP's must cater to the needs of their clients. Since the legislative process is extremely slow the constitution allows the passage of 'mini laws' by committee. These laws have a restricted scope and are usually concerned with issues of public employment or social security and are used to fulfill the clientelistic obligations of the Members of Parliament.<sup>131</sup>

Farneti observed two types of governments within the political system: the public and the obscure. The public government represented by Parliament is an open process in which everyone sees and carries out necessary legislation and functions in public. The obscure government is the party in power known as the sottogoverno. This sottogoverno provides the necessary channel between formality and

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<sup>131</sup>For the Parliamentary period 1983-1987 4,372 bills were presented in which only 374 were passed by the full Parliament. Over 750 laws were passed by committee and enacted as laws and 424 by governmental decrees. See Furlong, Modern Italy, 129.

reality.<sup>132</sup> Through sottogoverno the intent of Parliament is enacted into policy through the influence of parties and the government becomes the executioner of clientelistic favors. Therefore, formal decision making is a process in Italy that occurs through an iron triangle between party secretariats, the executive and the legislature both in chamber and in committee.

**The Executive.** The executive is composed of two separate positions: The President of the Republic as Head of State and the Prime Minister as Head of Government. The President symbolizes the country's identity and represents the "unity and continuity of the nation" without holding power or having the means to devise or implement policy on his own.<sup>133</sup>

He is elected by both houses and three delegates from each region for a seven year term. After a national election he chooses the Prime Minister (PM) and has final approval on laws. Although the President is empowered to nominate the PM this is rarely done. Party influence is

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<sup>132</sup>Paolo Forneti quoted in Geoffrey Pridham, Political Parties and Coalition Behavior in Italy, London: Routledge, 1988), 73.

<sup>133</sup>Germino and Passigili, Government and Politics of Contemporary Italy, 53. For a complete listing of the President's powers see page 52.

evident in government selection since the designation of a PM usually occurs when "party leaders have agreed on a particular coalition."<sup>134</sup>

### **The Government**

Governments in any society serve to (1) settle disputes by maintaining balance in the country between opposing groups, (2) institute new programs and (3) work with the state bureaucracy to make sure things run correctly.<sup>135</sup> In Italy these tasks become much more difficult due to a weak executive. The Italian Constitution had placed more restrictions on the government due to the Fascist experience. The designation of PM and a cabinet once approved by the President are subject to a vote of confidence by Parliament within 10 days. Since ministers are selected by party leaders based on their preference vote, candidates must dispense more patronage in order to increase their vote. Ministers are national figures who represent their client's and party's interests in the

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<sup>134</sup>Donald Sassoon, Contemporary Italy: Politics, Economy and Society Since 1945 (London: Longman, 1986.), 179. The selection of the President is also based on an agreement amongst the party leaders. For election it requires a 2/3 vote in both houses on the first three ballots and then only an absolute majority. The current President Luigi Scalfaro a former Christian Democrat was a secondary choice due to the breakdown of the Craxi-Andreotti-Forlani agreement in the Spring of 1992.

<sup>135</sup>Germino and Passigili, Government and Politics of Contemporary Italy, 71.

government. The government, usually composed of ministers from five parties has difficulty in taking decisive action but ensures a stable group of ministers who occupy cabinet positions in spite of the numerous changes of government.<sup>136</sup>

The Prime Minister in a coalition government is often a compromise candidate. Presiding over a Council of Ministers (cabinet) with members from other parties and factions within his the same party makes it difficult for one man to exercise a strong role.<sup>137</sup> The PM must be a skilled negotiator at reconciling different proposed pieces of legislation. His strengths are in negotiation not enforcement. They aim towards the distribution of concessions and balancing one group against the other.

The Prime Minister can rely only on his own faction. He serves as a chairman and since his position relies on the cooperation of the parties or factions his ability to

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<sup>136</sup>Up until the 1994 election, the ministries were continuously occupied by long time members of the ruling coalition. In this most recent election a new group of ministers and under secretaries entered government.

<sup>137</sup>Hine, Governing Italy, 199. The strength of the Prime Minister is based on the percentage of his party vote, the number of seats his party occupies, his personality and the amount of public support he enjoys through his patronage. In Italian politics the four strongest Prime Ministers were Alcide De Gaspari, Aldo More, Mario Anderotti and Benito Craxi.



influence them is slight.<sup>138</sup> In spite of the intended weaknesses of the executive vis a vis the Parliament, Article 77 of the Constitution does allow provisional measures of law to go into effect by government decree. These should only be done in case of emergency and necessity. They must be converted into law within 60 days and are enacted to apply a particular instrument of financial control which must be implemented without warning such as restriction on export of capital. They also serve as a check on Parliamentary excess when it issues its little laws.

#### **The Two Major Political Parties (1948-1992)**

**Christian Democrats.** The Christian Democrats in all European countries where they exist, fundamentally occupy the political center and have features of both the Left and the Right. Irving identifies them as a party "mid way between liberalism and collectivism, between capitalism and communism with a bias in favor of capitalism and

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<sup>138</sup>The government of Silvio Berlusconi formed in May 1994 was toppled by his coalition partner Hugo Bossi, leader of the Northern League over disagreements on the national budget.

liberalism."<sup>139</sup> Christian Democrats have no basic ideology of their own such as Marxism or Liberalism, rather they combine elements of liberal, conservative and socialist theory in order to formulate their own ideology. Their general beliefs include a right to personal property and anti-Communism. They also embody tenets of religious charity by rejecting 19th century liberalism, believing that the state must protect the weak in society by guiding the economy and close cooperation between government, industry, trade unions and the church.

The Italian Christian Democratic Party was an outgrowth of the pre-Fascist Italian Popular Party (IPP). Its support stemmed from Catholic workers in the north and the middle class nationally. It was anti-Communist with no set ideology and faction driven. The DC represented a "hybrid party" that took on its leadership from those who remained in the country during Fascism and was supported by the Catholic Church.<sup>140</sup> Despite its identification and support

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<sup>139</sup>R.E.M. Irving, The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe (London: Routledge, 1979), 18; quoted in Kees Van Kersbergen, "The Distinctiveness of Christian Democracy," in Christian Democracy in Europe. A Comparative Perspective, ed. David Hanley, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1944), 32.

<sup>140</sup>Leonardi, Democratic Transition in Post War Italy, 69.

from the Church it was not solely a Catholic party, but rather a "catch-all" party which has successfully kept the extreme right and left out of government while maintaining power by seeking a broad base alliance with center-right and center-left parties.

It unified its wide array of supporters through appeals to their religious identification, their thirst for power and suspicion of Marxism.<sup>141</sup> The party was characterized by its extensive use of clientelistic networks to unify the party through control of state agencies and industry, its Catholic and middle class base and the role of factions.

The DC's founder and first leader, Alcide De Gaspari, had served as the last party secretary of the IPP. During the Fascist years he found refuge and protection from the Catholic Church. Utilizing the support of the Church and its organization he founded the DC in 1943 and by 1945 had become Italy's Prime Minister and remained so until retiring in 1953.

During his rule the party had to cope with class,

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<sup>141</sup>Norman Kogan, A Political History of Post War Italy, From the Old to the New Center-Left (New York: Praeger, 1981), 3.

religious and regional cleavages, internal factionalism and a lack of an overall majority. De Gaspari kept the DC in power by avoiding ideological exclusions and governing with a center-right coalition of Republicans, Liberals and Social Democrats.<sup>142</sup> He integrated Italy into the international western community, joined NATO, and recognized all post war agreements. The United States supported De Gaspari and backed him with economic assistance in the form of financial support and food supplies using the logic that he was the best person to prevent a leftist take over. This close relationship with the United States opened him to attacks by enemies as being a US client.<sup>143</sup>

Since its victory in 1948 and until 1993 the DC has always remained in government. In the stretch of forty-six years and fifty-two governments, the DC held the Prime Minister's post for about thirty-eighty of those years. Its ability to control government was due to an excellent party organization generated during the economic development of the country. The DC through its economic programs designed

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<sup>142</sup>Sidney Tarrow, "Introduction", in Italian Politics: A Review, ed. Roberto Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1986), 2-3.

<sup>143</sup>Leonardi, Democratic Transition in Post-War Italy, 72.

to spur development increasingly involved the government in the economy by the establishment of special agencies that were either dominated by them or by interest groups with close relations to the party. This interweaving of party, state and government was the essence of the political clientelistic system.

Due to its uninterrupted control of power the DC became the primary source of clientelism in the political system. The party guaranteed privileged access to the scarce goods and services present at the government level. It used the power of patronage in ministries, public institutions and distribution of public resources through factions in order to build support within the party and serve as a source of political power. The DC through its consolidation of key ministries solidified its ties with vital socio-economic forces such as the Employers Federation (Confindustria), the Independent Farmers Organization (Coldiretti), and the Trade Union Confederation (CISL). Throughout Italy, sixty thousand special agencies served as a client network for the DC. This enabled it to transfer power out of government

institutions into other arenas they controlled.<sup>144</sup>

Clientelistic links centered around faction leaders associated with certain regions of the country.<sup>145</sup>

The DC through the sottogoverno was able to reinforce its political dominance and through its control of major state companies where it handed out patronage in return for votes. Government jobs were most sought after as these were the most secure, prestigious and offered good benefits. The DC controlled access to the jobs and was the central location that would give recommendations for someone needing a job. Once hired the individual still had to remain loyal to the party since future job promotions depended on how well in favor he was with his patron. The patrons ability to have his recommendations approved depended on how high his preference vote was and future electoral success.

Chubb's study of clientelism in Palermo found DC support was directly linked to the expenditure of public

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<sup>144</sup>Sarah Waters, "Tangentopoli and the Emergency of a New Political Order in Italy." West European Politics 17 (January 1994) : 175. This process of transferring power to external agencies such as the Fund for the Development of the South originated after the failure of its ability to change the electoral law in the DC's favor which if successful would have guaranteed the party an absolute majority in Parliament. Through this transfer, the DC leaders were able to transfer power and important decisions to the newly created agencies which they then controlled completely.

<sup>145</sup>The major DC leaders associated with their regions were Andreotti: Rome, Colombo: Luciana, Fanfani: Tuscany, Rumor: Veneto; Gava: Naples. See Zuckerman, Clientelistic Politics in Italy, 32-33.

resources in the form of patronage jobs, politically based promotions and a system of compensation which created positions of privilege, both for the individuals and public employees as a whole. The prevailing attitudes amongst the people interviewed was that it was necessary to have a patron if you wanted to get ahead and enjoy the stability, security and privilege conferred by public employment. She found having a patron was why they voted for the DC and obtaining public employment was tied to the selection of a specific candidate in the preference vote as an expression of patron-client bonds.<sup>146</sup>

The DC ensured electoral success by a variety of coercive measures. It offered cash payments to influential people in neighborhoods to ensure the vote. Threats of termination of employment, withholding of a government service or police harassment of business were used against those who did not support the DC.<sup>147</sup> The outright coercion and corruption the DC employed in ensuring victory especially in the south prompted one journalist to write

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<sup>146</sup>Judith Chubb, "The Social base of an Urban Political Machine: The Christian Democratic party in Palermo," in Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand, (New York: Sage Publication, 1981), 69-72.

<sup>147</sup>Ibid., 87.

that the people in order to keep the PCI out of power "had to hold their noses and vote DC"<sup>148</sup>

The DC maintained its dominance in Italian politics until just after the 1992 election. The collapse of communism and the revelation of the extent of the corruption had undermined its legitimacy. Its control of key ministries such as state security, led to abuses by showing preference to Catholics, surveillance of leftists and formally sanctioning and planning for a coup d'etat in the event of a PCI victory.<sup>149</sup> The elimination of the proportional representation system and its replacement by the majoritarian system in 75% of the Parliamentary seats and the electoral advance of the Northern League drastically weakened the DC. By spring 1993 its standing stood at 20%, equal to the PDS.

During its tenure the DC's major accomplishments included aligning Italy with the West, post-war reconstruction, presiding over a post war boom, and a

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<sup>148</sup>Sacco, Italy After Communism, 29.

<sup>149</sup>The Gladio Plan was devised by NATO at the height of the Cold War. It included training and deployment of special anti-Communist paramilitary forces in the event of a victory by the PCI seemed imminent. See Weinberger, The Transformation of Italian Communism, 83.



modernization program which lifted the country out of the ruins of war to the fifth largest economy in the world today, a high standard of living and excellent social benefits. These advances came at a high price in the cost of clientelism and corruption to keep the DC in power.

**The Italian Communist Party.** The Italian Communist Party was founded in January 1921 at the Congress of Livorno. It separated from the PSI when that party refused to accept Lenin's twenty-one conditions for entry into the Communist International. Its first leader Antonio Gramsci developed the philosophy of Hegemony in which he modified the Marxist-Leninist view of a workers revolution and adapted the concept of the class struggle to Italian conditions.

After his imprisonment by the Fascist regime the party was run by Palmiro Togliatti from 1926 until his death in 1964. Togliatti spent the Fascist years and WWII exiled in the USSR, served as vice secretary of the Comintern and became a trusted subordinate of Stalin. As a close collaborator of Stalin he played a role in eliminating the Trotskyists and Anarchists in Spain, supported the execution

of Polish Communists and Bukharin's trial and execution.<sup>150</sup> Upon his return to Italy Togliatti rejected a workers revolt and a bid for power through revolutionary means and in July 1944 at Salerno accepted the democratic principle of multi-parties, free elections and representative government calling it the "Italian Road to Socialism."<sup>151</sup>

The PCI gained enormous popularity and respect through its efforts in the resistance. Many of its members had fought in the Spanish Civil War and were part of the Popular Front of France. They worked with others of different political ideas under the banner of ridding the country of Fascism.

The resistance leadership transformed the PCI from a small clandestine party on a Leninist model to a mass oriented party that enjoyed broad support. Although a mass party it still maintained strong ties to Moscow. It supported Moscow in its foreign policy endeavors but maintained a "National Perspective" and defended the Italian

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<sup>150</sup>Weinberg, Transformation of Italian Communism, 21-22.

<sup>151</sup>At Salerno Italy in July 1944 Palmiro Togliatti made the famous speech known as the Svolta di Salerno or the About Face in Salerno. In this speech he surprised the Italians and Allies by accepting the democratic principle of free election and abandoned the workers revolution in the name of national unity.

Constitution and its parliamentary form of government.<sup>152</sup>

After the fall of Fascism, the PCI joined the government of National Unity which required Togliatti and the party to make significant compromises in their ideological positions. Its public acceptance of democracy ran contrary to the internal workings of the party. Party members adhered to Democratic Centralism, rigorous internal discipline and revolutionary rhetoric. Its strength lay in coherence and discipline of its leaders and members, its control of the largest trade union in Italy the CGIL and workers cooperatives in the red belt of Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany.

The ability of the PCI to gain power was subject to international decisions. The United States opposed the PCI or PSI participating in government. The PCI was perceived by the electorate as an ambiguous party that presented two almost contradictory images.<sup>153</sup> It respected the Italian Constitution and the right of the bourgeoisie and democracy

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<sup>152</sup>Gianfranco Pasquino, "Programmatic Renewal and Much More: From the PCI to the PDS," West European Politics 16 (January 1993): 164.

<sup>153</sup>Stephen Gundle, "The Italian Communist Party: Gorbachev and the End of Really Exciting Socialism," In Western European Communist and the Collapse of Communism, ed. D.S. Bell (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993), 22.

and on the other hand it wanted a socialist society, maintained a privileged link with the USSR, supported Marxist-Leninism and practiced Democratic Centralism. Throughout the 1940's and until the 1960's the PCI supported the USSR in world issues. It supported the expulsion of Tito from the Comintern and the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Throughout its history it was heavily financed from the USSR until 1991 and, therefore, not trusted to govern.<sup>154</sup> Only after the rise of Enrico Berlinguer did the PCI take any anti-Soviet positions.

Enrico Berlinguer, the party's most dynamic and charismatic leader led the party from 1972 till his death in 1984. Under his leadership the party made its biggest gains, became a non-governmental partner with the ruling coalition and then began a steady decline eventually leading to its transformation into the PDS.<sup>155</sup> Berlinguer revitalized his party and excited the public. He openly criticized the USSR and declared that the "October

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<sup>154</sup>Francesco Sidoti, "Italy: A Clean-Up After the Cold War," Government and Opposition 28 (Winter 1993), 108.

<sup>155</sup>While Berlinguer was Party Secretary, the PCI scored in largest electoral gain in 1976 with 34.4% of the vote. It then began on a downward trend receiving 30.4% in 1979 & 29.9 in 1983, the year before he died.

Revolution had ceased to be a propulsive force."<sup>156</sup>

In 1974 he formulated the theory of Eurocommunism that stated the PCI would rule Italy in accordance with respect for democratic rights as well as remaining within NATO and the EEC. This increased the party's popularity since the PCI was seen as a progressive force fighting a stagnant DC and its coalition partners. It reached its height of membership and electoral power in 1976 when it had 1.8 million members and received 34.4% of the vote, only 4% behind the DC. Its popularity raised fears by the US and NATO that the PCI could win the election and enter the government.<sup>157</sup>

Its high electoral vote forced the DC to recognize it as a strong opponent. Christian Democrat leader Aldo Moro who in the early 60's made the initial opening to the left and brought the PSI into government, took the first steps to arrive at a second opening to the left with the PCI. What resulted was the famous "Historic Compromise" from 1976-1979

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<sup>156</sup>Weinberger, Transformation of Italian Communism, 20.

<sup>157</sup>Ibid, . 21-22

between the DC and the PCI.<sup>158</sup> By entering into this agreement the PCI pledged to abstain from a no confidence motion against the government. In return the PCI was given access to some patronage jobs which included seats on boards of directors of state agencies and control of its own state run television station. It also received 25% of the chairmanships in Parliament and the Speakership of the Chamber of Deputies. The PCI cooperated with the government by getting legislation passed, influenced policy without being in government and received legitimacy as a constitutional party.

From 1976 to 1980 Italy was shaken by terrorism and instability, the most significant being the kidnaping and murder of Aldo Moro. The PCI led the charge against terrorism and backed the government in all its actions. Its strong governmental support resulted in a loss of popularity since it also had to assume responsibility for a slowdown in

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<sup>158</sup>The Historic Compromise came about from Berlinguer's assessment of the Allende government's collapse in Chile. He concluded that even if the PCI had won 51% of the vote, that would not guarantee their ability to govern, since right wing elements in the military and state security agencies would mount a coup d'etat to block the PCI from taking power. See Weinberg, 38-39.

the economy and other unpopular government policies.<sup>159</sup> It was attacked from the Left as a sell-out and from the Right as just a wolf in sheep's clothing waiting to take power. The PCI's loss of support was evident in the June 1979 elections when it dropped 4.4% from 1976. By 1980 the PCI terminated the Historic Compromise after it became obvious the DC was using the agreement to weaken the PCI by keeping it out of government and using it as a tool to control the left.<sup>160</sup>

Upon Berlinguer's death in 1984 Alessandro Natta took control of the party and was faced with a split of three factions between the Berlinguer centrists, the followers on the left of Pietro Ingrao who advocated a pro Moscow position and the Reformers on the right under Giorgio Napolitano who supported an alliance with the PSI.

In the mid 1980's the party was in rapid decline and its leadership was divided on how to proceed. The rise of the service sector, loss of manufacturing jobs, more wealth

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<sup>159</sup>The PCI's support of the government required it force workers to moderate wage demands, and it participated in the spoils system thereby acting just like the DC. Its initially slow response to terrorism lost it support from the right and then its active pursuit of terrorism and agreement with governmental economic policy lost its left wing supporters.

<sup>160</sup>Donovan, Party Strategy, 118.

and the coming to power of Gorbachev in the USSR forced a new relationship between the classes. This inability to adapt to the changing environment cost the party a bigger than expected loss in the 1987 election dropping 4% from 1979.<sup>161</sup>

Its 1987 defeat forced the party to make some changes. Vice Secretary Achille Occhetto took the lead in agitating for change. A party functionary from Milan he originally supported Pietro Ingrao and hard line Marxist principles. Named party secretary in 1989 after Natta's resignation Occhetto immediately realized the PCI had to change if it was to survive as a party after the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. While in London in 1989, Occhetto and British Labour Party Leader Neil Kinnock watched the fall of the Berlin Wall on television. This event marking the end of the Yalta Agreements and the Cold war convinced Occhetto decided that in order to survive the party needed to change.

In a meeting in November 1989, Occhetto stipulated the new party should be founded on a principle of democracy and human liberation but not anti-capitalism. The Central

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<sup>161</sup>Weinberger, Transformation of Italian Communism, 48-51.



Committee approved of the plan but wanted approval of the party congress. In order to accomplish his tasks Occhetto undertook some drastic reforms. He removed Democratic Centralism as a principle in the party, completely dismantled the party's organization principle, expanded central committee membership to those with minority positions, for the first time allowed public criticism of leaders discussions and publicly criticized Togliatti.<sup>162</sup> The long time cohesiveness and unity of the party had broken down.

In February 1991 at the party's 20th Congress his proposal was approved although not without dissent.<sup>163</sup> Its purpose was to "unblock the Italian party system" by providing a clear alternative to the continuation of DC rule.<sup>164</sup> Occhetto's goal was to create a new non Communist party of the left from all the progressive forces for

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<sup>162</sup>Weinberger, Transformation of Italian Communism, 54-63. In trying to improve the party's public image abroad Occhetto supported socialist leaders like Wily Brandt and Felipe Gonzales, traveled extensively and solidified bonds with European socialist parties, met with Gorbachev on the PCI's new course, supported Glasnost and Peristroika, visited the US and met with members of the US Congress, supported the Solidarity movement, denounced Tiennamen square and unsuccessfully tried to join the Socialist International.

<sup>163</sup>Stephen Gundle, "The Italian communist party: Gorbachev and the End of Really Existing Socialism," in Western European Communists and the Collapse of Communism, ed. D.S. Bell (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993), 31.

<sup>164</sup>Ibid. , 72

Italian society. He believed the PCI was not the "adequate instrument for political struggle" and wanted to disassociate himself from the Eastern Europeans."<sup>165</sup> The PCI was transformed into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and a small hard line faction left the party and formed the Refounded Communist Party (RPC). The PDS's adoption of US foreign policy objectives, market economy and capital accumulation caused additional dissent in the party. This convinced the PSI and DC that the PDS was still not ready to enter government.

The name Democratic Party of the Left was picked for a purpose. It left out socialism and social democracy. Occhetto said socialism was not being renounced but defined as meaning simply "a process of the comprehensive democratization of society."<sup>166</sup> Its major goals included: (1) the resolution of the long standing underdevelopment of the south, (2) introduction of a modern system of economic and industrial relations which would see an effective end to unemployment and (3) to refound the "democratic state"

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<sup>165</sup>Martin J. Bull, "Whatever Happened to Italian Communism? Explaining the Dissolution of the Largest Communist Party in the West," West European Politics, 14 (October 1991) : 96-97.

<sup>166</sup>Gundel, The Italian Communist Party, 42.

through major institutional reforms.<sup>167</sup> It believed in less state ownership and control of industries and using guidelines to regulate behavior and evaluating performance.

The new PDS moved away from its traditional theme of working class support and factory struggles to issues dealing with the environment, citizens rights, gender rights and European unity. It disavows racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia. It is becoming a party of both men and women, the latter now are in 40% of all leadership and executive positions.<sup>168</sup>

#### **Political Parties and Corruption**

Political corruption, institutionalized in Italy for many years is primarily driven by the parties need for money, maintenance of clientelistic links and desire to stay in power. These funds were initially required so that the DC and its coalition partners could counter the well organized and USSR financed PCI.<sup>169</sup> The need to keep the PCI out of office required money and the political parties of the government used their power of contracting and licensing

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<sup>167</sup>Ibid. , 42.

<sup>168</sup>Pasquino, From PCI to PDS, 60.

<sup>169</sup>Edward Luttwak, "Italy's Ancien Regime," Society 31 (Nov-Dec) 1993 : 74.

to extract bribes from business to finance party operations. Barkan, referring to this as "kleptocracy Italian style" noted how corruption was fed by the system of partitocrazia.<sup>170</sup>

The party members functioned similar to the nomenklatura of the former USSR. Investigators revealed that the public agencies acted as intermediaries between parties and private firms. They extracted payment from local companies in exchange for public works contracts. Political parties placed their own men on the board of the state electricity company (ENEL) to secure kick-backs from contracts for the construction of a new power station.<sup>171</sup>

The current political scandal began in February 1992 when a Socialist Party official was caught in a Milan sting operation with \$5,700.<sup>172</sup> This bribe money was collected from one of many business who made regular contributions to political parties in return for government contracts and

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<sup>170</sup>Joanne Barkan, "Italy: Corruption Metastasized," Dissent 40 (Summer 1993) : 280.

<sup>171</sup>The Economist, 20 February 1993, 45. Major agencies involved in the scandal included the National Roadways Agency, Municipal Agency for Environmental Services, Milan Transport Agency, National Institute for Workers Compensation, National Hydrocarbons Agency, and the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction

<sup>172</sup>This sting operation known as Mani Pulite (Operation Clean Hands) was lead by the Chief Magistrate of Milan Antonio Di Pietro and his team of investigators.

favours. Since the scandal's exposure over 6,000 people and 520 current and former members of Parliament were all placed under investigations in Italy's largest ever corruption scandal known as "Tangentopoli." Tangentopoli literally meaning city of bribes has shaken the political system to its very roots. The scandal struck at the center of the clientelistic system.

The close mutually beneficial linkages between the political parties and outside groups became a key source of electoral support for the ruling parties. The scandal highlighted the method whereby the DC and PSI used their clientelistic relations in order to extract bribes for either individual politicians or party funds.

Two former Prime Ministers are being investigated along with three previous cabinet ministers and at least 150 current MP's. In May 1995 former Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti was indicted on charges that he was the "Mafia reference in Rome" who provided legal protection to the Mafia and former Prime Minister Benito Craxi was charged and indicted for taking over twenty-nine million dollars in

bribes while the political boss in Milan.<sup>173</sup> He has subsequently fled to Tunisia to avoid prosecution. When the scandal was exposed Craxi sounded a warning to all the political parties when he stated, "We are all guilty let those whose parties did not take a dime cast the first stone. We may have to mend our ways yet if we allow this onslaught against the system to continue democracy will be the victim."<sup>174</sup>

Once the scandal was uncovered, many businessmen came forward and confessed. The extent of the corruption created a wave of protest and loss of confidence in the political system. These abuses are believed to account for 15% of the budget deficit. The cost of kickbacks linked to construction has been \$4 billion per year for the last decade.<sup>175</sup>

Political corruption was not the most severe crime of Italian politicians. Worse than accepting bribes to fill party coffers or personal wealth was the willingness of many southern politicians to work with organized crime. Located

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<sup>173</sup>Jane Kramer, The New Yorker, 28 March 1994, 71.

<sup>174</sup>Daniel Singer, "Italy's Summer of Discontent" The Nation 255 (31 August 1992): 204.

<sup>175</sup>John Andrews, "Vox Populi," The Economist, 26 June 1993, 9.

mainly in the Mezzogiorno, organized crime is composed of three different groups. The Camorra in the Naples areas, the N'drangheta in Calabria and the Mafia in Sicily. These groups collectively called the Mafia control all activities in the southern peninsula. The Mafia's power is enormous. Unofficially three Italian regions (Sicily with Palermo, Campania with Naples and Calabria) are no longer controlled by the public powers of the state.<sup>176</sup> Former interior minister Vincenzo Scotti calls it "an enemy within." Its power is so intimidating and unchecked that in 1990 it killed 2000 people.<sup>177</sup>

The Mafia was originally formed in Sicily over a century ago to protect peasants from unjust landlords and government. Its organization has transformed itself into a world-wide multi-billion dollar syndicate whose major source of income is public contracts, drug dealing and extortion from shopkeepers. It is estimated that extortion costs shopkeepers \$650 million per year. The Mafia assumed and kept power through its ability to have ties to friendly

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<sup>176</sup>Fabio Luca Cavazza, "The Italian Paradox: An Exit From Communism," Daedalus 121 (Spring 1992) 238.

<sup>177</sup>John Andrews, "Midday's Shadows," The Economist, 26 June 1993, 15.

politicians who would support their activities and keep the police away.

Since the beginning of the corruption scandal hundreds of politicians and local officials across the political spectrum have been charged with Mafia collaboration. Although the DC was the dominant party in the South, local crime bosses would align themselves with other elected politicians who were grateful for the votes it could deliver. In Palermo alone it delivered 200,000 votes and was primarily aligned with the DC. Through inducement, intimidation and by instruction the Mafia delivered votes to the listed candidates.

Links between the Mafia and politicians have been long assumed but the gangland murder of Salvo Lima in Sicily in March 1992 confirmed it. Mr. Lima a power broker for Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti was named by a parliamentary investigation on Mafia charges as the link between the Mafia and the political system. His death was seen as a warning to Andreotti of the Mafia's displeasure at the inability of Mr. Lima to arrange for acquittal of several hundred



imprisoned Mafiosi.<sup>178</sup>

Andreotti has been formally accused of protecting the Mafia. This charge raised ugly memories of the 1979 murder of a journalist and the 1982 murder of anti-Mafia commission chief Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa. It is believed these murders were committed under Andreotti's orders because these two people could link certain members of the DC to the 1978 Aldo Moro murder. The brutal assassinations of two anti-Mafia commissioners in 1992 only served to reinforce the disgust and contempt Italians had with the DC and its political allies.

Since Tangentopoli erupted, the Mafia has been weakened but not destroyed. The surprise arrest of some major political figures and hundreds of lower officials impinged on their operations. Although somewhat weakened the Mafia still exerts power and in spite of recent high profile arrests its power remains mainly unchecked.

#### **The 1992 National Elections**

The 1992 election was considered revolutionary in Italian history. There was a greater than normal shift in

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<sup>178</sup>Ibid, . 15.

voting patterns that resulted in the DC for the first time in its history receiving less than 30%, the PDS dropping 10% from its 1987 total and a huge gain for the regionalist Northern League Party. Due to the beginning of the Tangentopoli investigation and the indignation at the rise of Mafia violence, the voters expressed their displeasure by voting for alternative parties. Increased party lists from 442 in 1987 to 531 meant there were more parties competing for seats. New serious parties like the anti-Mafia La Rete (Network party) and the federalist Northern League entered Parliament with agendas specifically designed to address the concerns of their constituents. In all about fifteen parties entered Parliament as opposed to the usual eight or nine.<sup>179</sup> The results of the election are contained in Table 5, pg. 125.

The seeds of this electoral earthquake were sown years earlier. Bull and Newell in their analysis of the 1992 election point to issues that were all too well known. The end of the Cold War eliminated the fear of the PCI/PDS and the need to vote for the DC. The coalition of the DC and PSI proved it was unresponsive to the needs of the

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<sup>179</sup>Weinberg, Transformation of Italian Communism , 129-131.

Table 5

## The 1992 Election Results in the Chamber of Deputies

Party	Percent	Seats
DC	29.7	206
DS	16.1	107
PSI	13.6	92
The Northern League	8.7	55
MSI	5.4	34
PRI	4.4	27
PLI	2.8	17
RPC (Ex PCI)	5.6	35
La Rete	1.9	12
Greens	3	16
Panella	1.2	7
Others	3.7	5

Source: Corriere della Sera (8 April 1992), 1. Excerpted from Hine, Governing Italy, 76.

DC Christian Democrat  
 PDS Democratic Party of the Left ex Communist Party  
 PSI Socialist Party of Italy  
 MSI Italian Social Movement, Neo-Fascist  
 PRI Republican Party of Italy  
 PLI Liberal Party of Italy  
 La Rete The Network: Anti-Mafia  
 Panella Marco Pannella

voters. Italy was in the middle of an economic recession

and the parties in power were held responsible.<sup>180</sup> Lastly, the rise of La Rete and the Northern League and the elimination of the party lists encouraged the people to vote for other parties.

The DC as the country's biggest party dropped 4.6% from 1987 to 29.7% in the Chamber and lost 6.3% to 27.3% in the Senate. In spite of its losses it still led the PDS by 13.6%. Most of the DC'S losses were in the north (71%) and its biggest gains (4%) in the south.<sup>181</sup> The key factor in the DC's loss was the differences between the north and south. The Northern League polled 8% nationwide, 20% in the north, and took about 25% of the DC vote.

By not being able to use anti-Communism as an issue, the DC campaigned on a theme that they were the party of stability and without them the country would fall liable to instability and a fractured coalition.<sup>182</sup> It refused

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<sup>180</sup>Martin J. Bull and James L. Newell, "Italian Politics and the 1992 Elections: From Stable Instability to Instability and Change," Parliamentary Affairs 46 (April 1995): 206-214. The recession causes a low GDP growth of 1%, inflation of 6.4%, unemployment of 11% and a total national debt of 110% of GDP in 1991.

<sup>181</sup>Douglas A. Wertman, "The Christian Democrats: A Party in Crisis," in The End of Post War Politics in Italy: The Landmark 1992 Election, ed. Gianfranco Pasquino and Patrick McCarthy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 1920.

<sup>182</sup>Their battle cry to the electorate was the often quoted remark made by Louis XIV, "After us the deluge" and "Without us chaos." See Wertman, The Christian Democrats, 25.

renomination to about 20% of its deputies and senators in an unsuccessful attempt at last minute reform. The DC began losing support in the 70's and all efforts to reform the party failed.<sup>183</sup>

The PDS lost 10% from its 1987 vote. Its break away party, the Refounded Communist Party (RPC), received 5.6%. Most of its losses were in the industrialized belts of the north and parts of the south. It experienced a loss of 500,000 members since 1988, bringing its total membership to one million due to stiff competition from the RPC. In 1992, the PDS was "squeezed" between the PSI on the right and RPC on the left and emerged as a loser.<sup>184</sup> The PDS was perceived as a part of "government and opposition" due to its position of economic austerity and support for workers increase in wages. Occhetto also received a reputation as indecisive and oscillating.

The campaign of the PDS was aimed a convincing people that it was "part of the solution and not the problem" and therefore a viable alternative party. It emphasized its

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<sup>183</sup>This is only the second time so many MP's were not renominated. This compares to less than 10% in all election between 1953 and 1972. 25.5% in 1976, 6% in 1983, 17.3% in 1987.

<sup>184</sup>Grundel. The Italian Communist Party, 45-46.

role in challenging former President Cossiglia who was overstepping his bounds as president and wanted to be seen as a defender of the Republic for "excessive presidentialism."<sup>185</sup> Its main problem was increased competition from the RPC which forced it to take pro worker economic positions and therefore loose the support of the moderates. On the right flank, party raiding by the PSI caused it to loose right wing PDS supporters so that it became unappealing to both the right and the left.

The PSI, the third largest party in Italy suffered only slight losses of 0.8% although it failed in its bid to surpass the PDS and become the main party of the Left. Its largest losses were in the northern districts while its biggest gains were in the south. About 1/3 of its losses went to the Northern League.<sup>186</sup> Its inability to make any significant gains was due to: (1) not separating itself from

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<sup>185</sup>Patrick McCarthy, "The Italian Communists: Divide and Do Not Conquer," in The End of Post-War Politics in Italy: The Landmark 1992 Elections ed. Gianfranco Pasquino and Patrick McCarthy, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 33. For about six months prior to elections former President Cossiglia began speaking publicly about the corruption in Italy, the problem of the Mafia and the responsibility of the political parties and the politicians bore in these situations. These comments stirred loud protests from the main political parties since they felt that Cossiglia was indulging in politics rather than staying above the fray.

<sup>186</sup>David Hine, "The Italian Socialist Party and the 1992 General Election, in The End of Post War Politics in Italy: The Landmark 1992 Elections ed. Gianfranco Pasquino and Patrick McCarthy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 56-58.

the DC, (2) being in government and sharing the blame for its failure, and (3) acquiring characteristics of the governing class by benefiting from clientelism just as the Tangentopoli scandal was being exposed.

PSI leader Benito Craxi who was only the second non DC politician to hold the Prime Minister's seat from 1983 to 1987, determined the electorate considered the political system as unstable and ineffective. He campaigned on a platform offering "governability and decisiveness" with an ability to get things done.<sup>187</sup>

Craxi who had worked a deal to ensure himself the Prime Minister's seat while supporting Andreotti for President found himself in the position of a weakened party leader after the election due to the continuing revelations of scandal and corruption. His position was drastically weakened as judicial investigators began focusing in on his role as party chairman and leader in Milan. This led him to withdraw himself from consideration for PM and offer the vice-secretary of the PSI Giulio Amato as the replacement candidate.

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<sup>187</sup>Ibid. , 53-54.

Two minor parties of the governing coalition the Italian Republican and the Italian Liberal Party each increased their percentage of the vote by 0.7%. The PRI a party steeped the ideals of Guiseppe Mazzini has a center-left outlook and due to its prestige, ability of its leader and links with important sectors of the ruling class has more influence than its size of 4.4% indicates. It is an anti-clerical party that believes in cooperation between labor and capital with an emphasis on duties and rights. Its popularity peaked in the 1980's when its leader Giovanni Spadolini was named Prime Minister. It aims to reform the entire political system and has supported referendums dealing with direct election of the Prime Minister and winner take all parliamentary elections. The PLI has its roots in the Risorgimento and dominated Italian politics till the introduction of universal suffrage in 1912. The party vote is only 2.8% but it has important links with the industrial and financial world. It is to the right of the DC and its main support is from the south due its identification with the monarchy.

Two new parties that excited the electorate were the Northern League and La Rete (The Network). The League



received 8.7% of the vote and 55 seats in the Chamber while La Rete receive 1.9% and 12 seats.<sup>188</sup> The league led by its charismatic leader Umberto Bossi supported a Federalist state divided into three regions. He preached a message of disgust with the corruption and the waste of money in the south and the need for the north to stop supporting other regions. His message resulted in a 20% increase in votes from the north and the capture of the mayor's seat in Milan. La Rete a party founded by the socialist Orlando Leocoula of Palermo campaigned as an anti-Mafia party and capitalized on the peoples anger over increased in Mafia violence. It entered Parliament with 12 seats in 1992 but due to the new majoritarian electoral system it only won one seat in 1994.

The results of the 1992 election came as a surprise to the parties involved. The parties failed to heed the warning signs of calls for reform which began in the mid 1970s. Various referendums which dealt with reform of the political system were ignored and or opposed by the major

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<sup>188</sup>Hine Governing Italy, 76.

parties.<sup>189</sup> Longstanding institutional inadequacies in the political system resulted in a "major realignment."<sup>190</sup> This deep seated change not only affected society but its institutions and their relationship between society and the political system.

### **The 1994 National Elections**

The 1994 elections were billed as the most important elections since 1948. Sidoti described them as a form either of "restoration, reaction or continuation of revolution by other means."<sup>191</sup> Set amidst the revelations of the previous two years of scandal, Mafia terrorist attacks, government crises, electoral referendums and gains made by the PDS in 1993 local elections, these elections only three months before the national elections portended the rise to power of the PDS.<sup>192</sup> Table 6, pg. 134 contain the results of

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<sup>189</sup>The major referendums dealing with political reform were (1) eliminating state funding of political parties in 1978, (2) the abolition of the preference vote in 1991 and (3) the change from proportional representation to first past the post in 75% of Parliamentary seats in 1993.

<sup>190</sup>Pasquino and McCarthy, The 1992 Elections, 1. These inadequacies included fragmentation, coalition governments in crises, powerful parliament, lack of alternation of parties in power and widespread corruption.

<sup>191</sup>Francesco Sidoti, "The Significance of the Italian Election, Government and Opposition 41 (Summer 1994) : 94.

<sup>192</sup>In the municipal elections of 1993, the PDS won mayoral seats in Turin, Catania, Naples and Rome. Neither the DC nor the PSI won any seats.

the March 1994 election. Table 7, pg. 134 contains results by alliances.

In April 1993 the approval of the referendum designating that 75% of the Chamber seats be decided by the majoritarian system resulted in the Amato government's resignation and replacement by former Head of the Bank of Italy Carlo Chiampi, the first non parliamentarian Prime Minister to head a government of technocrats. His task was to pass a budget that would reduce the deficit and stabilize the lire within ECU standards. In January 1994 Chiampi passed the budget amid a growing unemployment rate that reached 13%, a contraction of GDP by 1% and total debt still at about 108% of GDP.<sup>193</sup> Having offered his resignation to the President, elections were scheduled for March 27, 1994.

The campaign was between the left wing Progressive Alliance of the PDS, RPC, La Rete, Greens and the Democratic Alliance against the right wing Alliance for Freedom composed of Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia Party, Hugo Bossi's Northern League and Gianfranco Fini's National Alliance formerly known as the neo-Fascist Italian Social

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<sup>193</sup>New York Times 14 March 1994, 4.

Table 6

1994 Election Results in the Chamber of Deputies	
Party	Percent
Forza Italia	21
National Alliance	13.5
Northern League	8.4
PDS	20.4
RPC	6
Greens	2.7
La Rete	1.9
Democratic Alliance	1.2
IPP	11.1
Segni Pact	4.6
Others	9.2

Source: Corriere della Sera (8 April 1992), 1. Excerpted from Hine, Governing Italy, 76.

Table 7

1994 Election Results by Alliances		
	Percent	Seats
Progressive Alliance	32.2	213
Freedom Alliances	42.9	366
Pact for Italy	15.7	46
Others	9.2	5

Source: Italian Interior Ministry, excerpted from The Economist, 2 April 1994, 45.

RPC: Refounded Communist Party: Breakaway from PDS  
 PDS Democratic Party of the Left  
 La Rete The Network: Anti-Mafia  
 Segni Pact Political movement founded by Mario Segni  
 IPP Italian Popular Party

Movement. The Left campaigned on a platform of economic politics stressing social democracy with policies espousing market oriented values. The Right stressed deregulation, privatization, reduced public spending and creation of jobs through reduction of employee costs.<sup>194</sup>

In December 1993, Silvio Berlusconi, Italian billionaire owner of three television stations launched his Forza Italia Party (Go, Go Italy!) specifically to head off a leftist victory. Berlusconi established a political organization throughout the country in a matter of only a few weeks. He opened more than 13,000 political clubs and used his three television stations, advertising agency and real estate firm to project his image. He promised the Italians a "new Italian miracle" on a par with the post WWII Italian Boom. He took pro-religion, business and family positions and anti-mismanagement, bureaucratic, and Communist positions.<sup>195</sup> Berlusconi realized before his leftist opponents could that the new electoral law would favor those making alliances. He made electoral agreements in single member districts where the Northern League and

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<sup>194</sup>Sidoti, The Significance of the Italian elections, 334.

<sup>195</sup>Ibid., 339.

National Alliance were weak and was able to counter the strength of Progressive Alliance candidates.

Throughout the campaign Berlusconi was attacked by the Left for his close association with former Prime Minister Benito Craxi, his membership in the P2 Masonic lodge which in the early 80's was involved in a plot to overthrow the government and his control of three television stations.<sup>196</sup> As a Craxi supporter he was the recipient of certain favorable zoning and environmental laws to help build housing and Craxi made changes to the monopoly laws so Berlusconi could buy his three TV stations.<sup>197</sup>

While the Progressive Alliance campaigned specifically to raise taxes on treasury bonds, withdrawal from NATO, halt privatization and ridiculed Berlusconi for his anti-Communist position and alleged associations with the Mafia, the right under Berlusconi was promising the creation of one million jobs, the reduction of taxes and mass economic prosperity. The campaign drew down to a match between

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<sup>196</sup>Gianfranco Pasquino, "The Birth of the Second Republic," Journal of Democracy 5 (July 1994): 110.

<sup>197</sup>Kramer, Dirty Hands, 80

"professional politicians and outsiders" or the state vs the market.

Throughout the campaign Berlusconi maintained an uneasy alliance with his two coalition partners the Northern League and the National Alliance. Both diametrically opposed to the other's platform only the possibility of entering government and gaining power kept them together.

The March 1994 election proved to be a landmark election. For the first time in almost fifty years none of the old parties gained power. The DC which dissolved itself in January 1994 and became the Italian Peoples Party (IPP) received 11% of the vote and the Progressive Alliance of the Left amassed 32%. The PDS increased its vote by 4% since 1992, but as the party favored to win, it was seen as a defeat and shortly after the lackluster performance in the June 1995 European elections, Achille Occhetto resigned and was replaced by Massimo D'Alema. The PSI the first of the mass parties that was founded in 1882 did not enter parliament.

Berlusconi's Alliance for Freedom coalition won an absolute majority in the Chamber and a qualified majority in the Senate. It took almost two months to form a coalition

that could be approved by Parliament. In mid-May 1994 a government was formed which for the first time placed neo-Fascists in power. The coalition was beset by internal differences before it could function. Hugo Bossi did not feel comfortable with either Fini or Berlusconi claiming they were both undemocratic. Almost immediately conflict of interest charges arose over Berlusconi's investment and associates who entered the government. The government was unstable at its inception and it lasted only a mere seven months. Bossi pulled his support for the government over his disagreement on the budget and the coalition collapsed and Italy was faced with a new government crises. In January 1995, President Scalfaro appointed technocrat Lambertino Dini to head a non partisan government, pass a budge and prepare for possible elections in the Fall of 1995.

Far from being the dramatic election that it was made out to be, the 1994 elections were just the same style with different actors. The government still had to go in coalition, it had to cut deals and offer cabinet posts in accordance with the percentage of the vote and it was still under the control of the party leaders. Given the short



life span of the government the data is inconclusive as to its value. It appears that Berlusconi's television campaigning may have won the election, but his inability to compromise and play politics cost him his job.

## Chapter 4

### NEW PARTY CONFIGURATIONS AND THE EMERGING SYSTEM

Since the mid 1960's the industrialized western nations have undergone major transformations in their economies, social structures, culture and value systems. Hans-George Betz cites as causes the collapse of Soviet style state socialism which allowed capitalism to become the dominant method of carrying out economic relations and the advent of the global economy. In the global economy production, markets, capital and labor, information and technology are organized across national-boundaries by major multi-national corporations with small and medium sized companies that connect through networks to larger firms. This has resulted in nation-states exhibiting less control over their economics.<sup>198</sup>

Most of the advanced industrial countries have changed their basis of production from heavy industry and mass

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<sup>198</sup>Hans-George Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 27.

production to a service and information sector that targets its products to selected markets. These changes have dramatically affected the labor market. The industrial society required large amounts of labor, much of it unskilled and today's market requires a smaller specialized more highly skilled work force.

G. Esping-Anderson describes the present day labor market split between a core and periphery sector. The core contains highly demanding and attractive jobs while the periphery contains undesirable "junk jobs."<sup>199</sup> Groups within the peripheral sector include young people without formal education, single-parent households, immigrants and their families, old people living on minimal pensions, the homeless and unemployed. Currently unemployment in the European Union stands at about 12% and it is increasingly difficult for many to find good jobs as in previous generations.

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<sup>199</sup>G. Anderson-Esping, "Postindustrial Cleavage Structures: A Comparison of Evolving Patterns of Social Stratification in Germany, Sweden, and the United States in Labor Parties in Postindustrialist Societies," ed. F. Fox Piven, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 204; quoted in Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 28. The core is composed of predominately mobile males between 30-50 year with formal professional education, employed permanently full-time with job security, benefits and promotions. The periphery is composed of individuals whose skills are not in demand, unskilled labor, the underemployed and the unemployed.

Millions of people are disappointed, angry, and frustrated with their nation's leaders and institutions due to their inability to address the issues of unemployment, immigration and lower social conditions. Their confidence in the political system and its institutions shaken, has resulted in this group looking to non mainstream political parties for solutions. The largest beneficiaries of these attitudes are the extreme right-wing parties who express to a large degree the attitudes and sentiments felt by an increasing number of people whose concerns are not addressed by the mainstream parties.<sup>200</sup>

Parties such as The National Front in France, The Republikaner in Germany, The Northern League and National Alliance in Italy are right-wing parties that reject individual and social equality and programs seeking to achieve it, oppose social integration of marginalized groups and appeal to xenophobia and at times outright racism and anti-Semitism. They display populist sentiments by

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<sup>200</sup>Piero Ignzai, "The Silent Counter Revolution. Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe," European Journal of Political Research 22 (July 1992): 6.

addressing public feelings of anxiety and disenchantment and extol the common man and his superior common sense.

These parties have blended classical liberal positions on the individual and the economy along with some elements of the social agenda of the new right.<sup>201</sup> Scheuch and Klingeman consider the rise of right wing populism throughout the world a natural phenomena in all industrialized societies and should be seen as a "normal pathological condition" of modern democracies.<sup>202</sup> This indicates that the popularity of these parties results from common events shared by all western style democracies. Since these parties are political organizations and exist by the vote, one common element is the change of the party system. The rise of mass media, new parties, political experts and special advisors has altered the voting habits of the individual. Ignazi notes that in Western Europe, he

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<sup>201</sup>Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, 4.

<sup>202</sup>E.K. Scheuch and H.D. Klingemann, "Theorie des Rechtsradikalismus in Westlichen /industriegesellschaften," Hamburger Jahrluch fur Wirtschafis - und Gesellschaftspolitik 12 (1976): 11-29; quoted Betz, Radical Right-Populism in Western Europe, 23. Some of the nationalistic movements around the world include: Nationalist-Populism of Pat Buchanan, Anti-Establishment Populism of Ross Perot in the US, Preston Manning's Canadian Reform Party: A western Canadian party wanting a homogenous western Canada protected against Eastern and French Canadians, and The Bharatiya Janata Party in India blends free market liberalism and Hindu Fundamentalism

has noticed a de-alignment of the traditional party alignments.<sup>203</sup>

The changing socioeconomic structure has caused the end of traditional political alignments. People vote more on the issues than by party ticket. Voting is no longer the confirmation of belonging to a special group but an individual choice.<sup>204</sup> Voter participation in the electoral process is also decreasing in Western Europe. In the 1993 French parliamentary elections only 63% voted, while in Germany's first unified elections in 1990 ten million people did not vote, an increase of three million from 1987. In Italy only 86% of the electorate voted in the March 1994 election and from 1978-1987 the number of blank and invalid votes increased from 1.5-2.6 million even though voting is mandatory.<sup>205</sup>

Recent electoral results reflect the rise and expansion of radical right wing populist support in Western Europe.

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<sup>203</sup> Ignazi, The Silent Counter-Revolution, 4.

<sup>204</sup> "Berlusconi Bruised," The Economist, 29 April 1995, 58.

<sup>205</sup> Hoffman-Martinot, "Parteiensystem Nach Den Parlaments Wahlen," Aus Politik Und Zeitgeschichte 10-16 August 1993, 12; Starzacher, K., Schacht, K., Friederich, B., and Leif, T. eds. Protestwohler Und Wahlverweigerer: Krise der Demokratie? (Cologne: Bund, 1992); ISPES, Rapporto Italia 91 (Rome: Vallecchi Editore, 1991) Chapter 21, quoted in Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, 39.

In the past several years many of these parties entered Parliament for the first time and some became a significant force in government. In Italy two right wing parties, the Northern League and National Alliance received enough votes in the March 1994 national elections to govern with the Forza Italia party. These parties which previously had only a fraction of the vote they enjoy today surprised the political experts by their strong showing. They upset the long established political system, are not traditional politicians and consider themselves more as a social movement that reflects a new electoral outlook.

#### **The Northern League**

In the April 1992 Italian national elections, The Northern League (NL) a small regionalist party whose strength was centered in the Lombardy and Veneto regions surprised Italy by receiving 8.7% of the national vote and 55 seats in the Chamber of Deputies surpassing its 1987 vote by 8.2%. In the March 1994 national election it received 8.5% of the vote but due to changes in the electoral law it nearly doubled its representation in Parliament and as a

member of the governing coalition from May-December 1994 controlled six ministries<sup>206</sup>.

The NL's rise to prominence and national power occurred over a short time span. Its roots lie in the Venetian League founded in 1979 by Franco Rocchetto. The Venetian League wanting the Veneto to preserve its cultural identity demanded that the Venetian dialect be recognized as an official language. The League called for greater autonomy in the region and blamed the central government for their problems. It emphasized its cultural heritage, drew associations with the Venetian Republic and argued that based on a 3,500 year old culture and a history of independence it should be a nation.<sup>207</sup> In 1983 the party elected one member to Parliament, although it soon lost the seat.

Concurrently other areas in the north were forming their own leagues with a similar message of cultural identity and Roman misrule. By 1990 all the Leagues united

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<sup>206</sup>While the League was in government it controlled the following ministries: Interior, Budget, European Union and Regional Affairs, Industry, University and Science and Institutional Reform.

<sup>207</sup>Tom Gallagher, "The Regional Dimension in Italy's Political Upheaval: Role of the Northern League 1984-1993." *Parliamentary Affairs* 47 (July 1994): 458.



and formed the Northern League led by Hugo Bossi leader of the Lombardy League.<sup>208</sup> The League was bound to the ideals of autonomy and federalism. Its symbol was an armor clad warrior holding a raised sword in one hand and a shield in another. This symbol evoked the memory of the original twelfth century Lombard League which gained a considerable amount of autonomy for several northern city-states from Frederick I (Barbarossa) the Holy Roman Emperor.

Under Bossi's well organized political and leadership skills the NL made impressive gains. Beginning with only one seat in Parliament in 1989 by 1993 it had elected 80 Deputies and Senators from seven northern provinces. It captured the mayor's seat in Milan with 40% of the vote and dislodged the Christian Democrats in Varese and Monza and the Socialists in Milan. In the 1992 national election it received 20% of the northern vote and from 1979-1992 increased its electoral margin by 17.8% and prompted Bossi to declare the NL as "Masters of the North."<sup>209</sup> At the end of

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<sup>208</sup>Tom Gallagher, "Rome at Bay, The Challenge of the Northern League to the Italian State," Government and Opposition 27 (Autumn 1992): 474. The other regional leagues were from Lombardy, Venice, Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna, Liguria, Tuscany and Friuli.

<sup>209</sup>Frank Viviano, "The Fall of Rome," Mother Jones, Sept-Oct 1993, 38.

1992, Bossi had become what one observer described as the person who "in only one year has done more to change Italian politics more than anyone else has done in thirty."<sup>210</sup> Bossi a medical student in the late 1970's and socialist activist was converted to the ideas of autonomy and federalism by Bruno Salvadori an activist for the Union Valdotaïne a regional party representing the semi-autonomous region Val D'Aosta (Aosta Valley).

Umberto Bossi is an aggressive often crass individual who frequently makes remarks that are insulting, threatening and full of sexual innuendo.<sup>211</sup> In the March 1994 campaign and later while in government, he continuously criticized and berated his coalition partners. This brash outspokenness although not accepted in normal political circles is popular in the north. His supporters view him as someone who is honest, straightforward and not afraid. His investigations into North-South relations led him to conclude that the "original sin" of the Italian political

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<sup>210</sup>Enzo Golino, L'Espresso, 1 November 1992, 30 interviewed by Denis Mack Smith, quoted in Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, 8.

<sup>211</sup>Bossi's most threatening statement was in September 1993, when facing investigation as part of the Tangentopoli scandal he publicly told the magistrates that "their lives were only worth 300 lire: the cost of one bullet." W.V. Harris, "Italy Purgatorio," New York Review of Books, 3 March 1994, 39.

system was its "repressive bureaucratic centralism."<sup>212</sup> His slogans of "Rome=Mafia," "We work, Rome robs," and "Away from Rome," evoke resentment against central control and domination by a bureaucracy controlled by people from the south.<sup>213</sup>

The NL combines several distinct issues that concern northern Italians. It addresses their lack of confidence in nation's institutions especially political parties by offering itself as the "antithesis to party politics."<sup>214</sup> Bossi presents the League as a movement that takes its power and guidance from the people rather than an insulated corrupt political party like the DC. He then precedes to blame the crisis of the Italian welfare state on the political parties whose corrupt and clientelistic practices have wasted vast sums of northern Italian taxpayer money for development projects in the south. He finally focuses on peoples' communities where the social transformation of the

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<sup>212</sup>Hugo Bossi and D. Vimercati, La Rivoluzione. La Lega: Storia e Idee [The Revolution, The League: History and Ideas], (Milan: Sperling & Kupfer, 1993), 33; quoted in Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, 8.

<sup>213</sup>Codevilla, A Second Italian Republic, 152.

<sup>214</sup>Dwayne Woods, "The Crisis of the Italian Party State and the Rise of the Lombard Leagues," Telos 93 (Fall 1992) : 120.

new world order is felt the most and chastises the inefficient, southern dominated state bureaucracy that redirects tax money away from the north towards the south. Citing these examples, he argues that the Italian state does not embody the principles of an impersonal, merit driven non political bureaucracy but rather Italy as a state possess "the parasitic aspects of a clientelistic state."<sup>215</sup>

By arguing against the centralist movement and for a return to traditional identities and values in the community, the League is riding the wave of a populist movement that is not anti-modern but anti-central. Its call for increased autonomy and a three region federated state is an appeal to devolve more power to the local communities so that individuals can exercise greater control over their own lives, while attempting to make territory rather than class or ideology the "main basis of political identification."<sup>216</sup>

The League's foundation rests on the concept of territorial identity which considers northern Italians as an ethnic group. This ethnic identity evolves around an

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<sup>215</sup>Ibid, . 120.

<sup>216</sup>Gallagher, Role of the Northern League 1984-1993, 456.

assertion that its people are more productive and useful than in other parts of the country. This results in more wealth, a higher standard of living and therefore an honest, fair and better run society.

The ethnic identity is supplemented with the symbols of the medieval knights, flags and songs, ritualistic language at mass rallies, demonstrations and festivals. The effects of the north's cultural identity is a discriminatory action against the north by having to pay more taxes to the central government than what it receives.

The main target of their discontent is the flow of money into the south. The League, resentful over the huge amount of waste and corruption in southern management of funds wants to cease contributing to the south's development programs. It believes that the poor and underdeveloped south is no longer "their responsibility" and the south must learn self reliance.<sup>217</sup>

Within its northern strongholds the League supports the Catholic values of defense of family, education and is

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<sup>217</sup>John Torpey, "Affluent Secessionists: Italy's Northern League," Dissent (Summer 1994) : 314. The north produced 70% of GNP with only 15% of the population.

opposed to the myth of easy money. This identity has proved valuable since most of the lost votes of the Christian Democrats in the 1992 election went to the NL. The upshot is to maintain the traditional Catholic sub-culture identification that once supported the DC and transfer support from a traditional political party (DC) to a social movement (NL).

Contrary to his critics who say this is a return to the past and therefore an attempt to link the league with Fascism, Bossi wants Italians to identify more with their local and urban areas. This would instill civic pride and result in a well managed regional entity that would respect "local traditions and interests" better than the centralized nation-state.<sup>218</sup> The League rejects accusations that it is a right-wing or reactionary movement. It defines the problem in Italian life as the struggle between any ruling political class and the people. It is a popular movement that aims to curb the excessive powers of the partitocrazia and return more democratic power back to the people.

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<sup>218</sup>Woods, Crisis of the Italian Party State, 119. Seymore Lipset describes Fascism as "an extreme response of the middle class which saw its social position and status threatened by modernization". Bossi's comments on immigration and southerners being the problem in Italian society evokes memories of Hitler's castigation of the Jews in Germany.

The League's main goal is to transform Italy from a unitary to a federal state composed of three autonomous regions in the north, central and south modeled after Switzerland or Belgium. The regions would govern themselves and remove the central government from making local decisions. This derives from the League's belief that a single Italian state never existed either "historically or culturally."<sup>219</sup> League members consider Italy as consisting of Lombardy, Piedmont and Venice with its common historical tradition and language and do not consider the southern part of the country as Italy.

In the northern regions, the League proposes preferential treatment for the native born Lombard population with regards to employment, housing, social services and public administration. Within each region the League recognizes the principles of subsidiary by allowing recognition of autonomous units at the local level in order to avoid reproducing within an autonomous region the same problems of centralization existent at the national level.

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<sup>219</sup>"Lega Nord," Emilia-Romagna, 2; quoted in Gallagher, Rome at Bay, 481.

The League's concepts of regionalization calls for a central government with limited powers. Ardent regionalists point to the Risorgimento's policy of imposed centralization from above without any regard to respecting the peninsula's cultural and regional differences. Local needs became subordinated to the interests of the major parties. Frequently mayors, administrators and prefects were centrally appointed and lacked any concern for the area. This rapidly resulted in local government fraught with corruption and clientelistic links established between the center and periphery.

Bossi's support of regionalism stems from his views that national governments are rapidly becoming superfluous. Steering a course between regionalism and internationalism he looks at local government making decisions on roads, schools and hospitals while larger decisions would be handled by the European Parliament.<sup>220</sup> With the exception of defense, foreign policy and issuance of currency, the League does not envision a major role for the national government.

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<sup>220</sup>Mark Gilbert, "Warriors of the New Pontida: The Challenge of the Lega Nord to the Italian Party System," Political Quarterly 64 (January-March 1993): 104.



These ideas however are not fully accepted. In an August 1991 survey by the Turin newspaper *La Stampa*, 70% of voters in Lombardy disliked the idea of dividing Italy into regions.<sup>221</sup> Woods points out that regionalists fail to recognize that their claim to having distinct ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities based on regions has not been strong enough to overcome the identification of sharp ethnic or linguistic differences.<sup>222</sup>

The League's second objective involves the highly emotional issue of immigration. Two groups it takes issue with are "foreigners from outside the European Union" and those from the southern Italy either as workers in the north or public servants.<sup>223</sup> The League considers Third World immigrants as a threat to the cultural integrity of Italy and to the individual regions. In Italy there are over one million illegal workers mainly from Africa traveling throughout the country looking for work. The League rejects

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<sup>221</sup>La Stampa, 16 September 1991, quoted in Gilbert, Warriors of the New Pontida, 104.

<sup>222</sup>Dwayne Woods, "The Centre No Longer Holds: The Rise of Regional Leagues in Italian Politics," West European Politics, 15 (April 1992): 72. Due to mass migration of southern Italians into northern Italy it would not be accurate to associate the regionalist movement with the Basques in Spain or the Tyrolean separatists in Italy.

<sup>223</sup>Daniel Singer, "Italy's Summer of Discontent," The Nation 31 August 1992, 205. The term immigrants outside the European Union is a euphemism for Africans.

these immigrants on the grounds they pose a "threat to the stability and order of society."<sup>224</sup> It echoes concerns that the infrastructure is unable to cope with the large influx of people from the Third World and criticizes the 1990 Martelli Law which granted amnesty to illegal aliens. The League accuses Rome of giving Italian nationality to immigrants in order to expand their clientelistic base. In an attempt to defer criticism of its racist rhetoric, the League has taken a pro European Union policy of increased investment in Africa and condemns the government for providing sub-standard living conditions and using blacks as cheap labor.

The second aspect of the League's immigration policy is reducing and eventually eliminating southern migration into northern Italy. The League blames the south for public mismanagement, corruption, inefficiency and a high percentage of southerners in the governing parties, and bureaucracy.<sup>225</sup> Its analysis of the political corruption

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<sup>224</sup>Woods, The Centre No Longer Holds, 61.

<sup>225</sup>Official statistics differs sharply from the League's claim of southern domination of the bureaucracy and political system. It is true that 60% of the bureaucracy is from the south, but as for political parties 41.5% of the party leaders are from the north while 36.7% are from the south. The ratios of ministers in the cabinets are even. Southerners do not dominate any key positions in parties. In the economic sector southerners are clearly a minority. See Woods, Centre No Longer Holds, 50.

and unsatisfactory public services of the state is explained as loosing the values of hard work and honesty which characterize the North. This occurs since the electoral base is shifting to the south and parties have to cater to the southern vote.

Bossi considers southern Italians as a cultural "otherness"<sup>226</sup> that are different than northerners. In order to mobilize his constituents in the North, he refers to his supporters as "soldati dal Nord" (Soldiers from the North) and to southerners as Mafia dal sud (Mafia from the south).<sup>227</sup> League leaders dispute claims of racism and insist that the problem of the south lies in its reliance on government handouts and in order to fully modernize it must rely on its own resources. Party strategist and economist Paolo Friggerio supports policies benefiting individuals and not groups. He does not trust anyone who is a party member and part of the governing class from Rome. For Friggerio,

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<sup>226</sup>Hugo Bossi, interview in Epoca, 20 May 1990, 12-16 in Wood, Centre No Longer Holds, 61.

<sup>227</sup>Ibid., 61.

"Italy means nothing."<sup>228</sup> This attitude shared by many League members is an expression of frustration and contempt at the failure of the central government to act correctly. He rejects criticism that the League is racist or xenophobic and aims his wrath against "the tax collector, the Roman invader and the rotten politician."<sup>229</sup>

Guilio Savelli author of the book What the League Wants analyzes the southern social structure and concludes that there is almost no economic activity that does not depend on politics. Political connections are necessary throughout the south in order to open a business or even get a hospital bed. This also occurs in the north, but with less frequency and the individual can always "retreat into the private sector without any difficulty."<sup>230</sup> This structure contributes to the large difference between the regions and in the 1960's-1970's the northern region drew closer to Europe and became prosperous while the south lagged. The

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<sup>228</sup>Viviano, The Fall of Rome, 38-39. The full quotes are from Corrado Peraboni a League MP: "It is simply our view that the south will never develop is it is always fed on our handouts. Manuella Malcangro, party activist and originally from southern Italy: It isn't a question of racism for us, but of doing what is necessary to enter the modern world. Get rid of the past and embrace the future."

<sup>229</sup>Singer, Italy's Summer of Discontent, 205.

<sup>230</sup> Guilio Savelli, Che Cosa Vuole La Lega, [What Does the League Want] 121 in Gallagher, Rome at Bay, 478.

northern economy based on low technology and high craftsmanship prospered.

In the 1980's incomes in the south were still 40% behind the national average. Thus, northerners believe that their hard work, taxes, and savings were stolen to promote development schemes in order to keep the ruling class in power.<sup>231</sup> This protest has evolved into a refusal by the North to subsidize the poorer South and an attempt to redistribute resources northward. The South serves as a scapegoat for the NL who criticize the partitocrazia as a southern phenomenon fueled by Patron-Client links and regional biases in favor of the South.

Prior to the end of the Cold War there was minimal discontent in the North about the problems of Italy. During the Cold War, the party system remained unchanged in order to counter the Communist Party. Once it ended, the Northern Leagues directed peoples attention to the gap between the partitocrazia and society. This issue coupled with "disaffection and disenchantment" for established political

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<sup>231</sup>Gallagher, Rome at Bay, 475. Sicily's income average is 29% the national average, while in Calabria, Italy's poorest region it income average is 42% below the national average.

institutions held responsible by the public for the social, cultural and economic crises of Italy increased the League's appeal.<sup>232</sup> The NL also benefited by the inability of the state to respond to the situation created by the fall of the USSR and the resistance of the parties to reform. The League increased its popularity and credibility even further by projecting itself as an honest organization offering a "bold departure from the Italian partitocrazia."<sup>233</sup>

The Northern League succeeded in becoming the major center-right party in Northern Italy. It achieved its dominance through continuous criticism of the partitocrazia and its patron-client connection between Rome and the South. The League positioned itself to lead the struggle against inefficiency and corruption. It stood as the party that advocated the elimination of clientelism, an impartial bureaucracy, a free market economy tax reduction and autonomy.<sup>234</sup> These programs aimed at stimulating business

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<sup>232</sup>Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, 48.

<sup>233</sup>Torpey, Official Secessionists, 321.

<sup>234</sup>Viviano, Fall of Rome, 38. Specific issues included: (1) a separation of official life from private life, (2) the creation of an efficient state bureaucracy, (3) remove state imposed barriers to entrepreneurial activity, (4) free market reforms focusing on industrial policies of small and medium firms, (6) link universities to business to serve technological innovation, (7) more regional autonomy, (8) a reduction in taxes.

the electorate in 1992 and propelled the NL onto the national scene and established it as a force to be reckoned with.

Its supporters vote for the League in order to preserve their affluent Northern European lifestyles. They are afraid of ending up like the south and having the Mafia control them. They want to remain in Europe rather than sliding into the third world. Most of the NL's votes came from the DC in 1992. It was second only to the DC in Lombardy and had become at that time "more successful than any other protest movement."<sup>236</sup> It received 45% of its support from the DC and 30% from previous PSI voters. By standing outside the usual Left-Right conflict and positioning itself in the center it was able to benefit from DC and PSI votes.<sup>237</sup>

In the March 1994 national election the League made its greatest gains. In areas where it was weak it formed strategic alliances with Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia. Once in government the NL played a divisive and obtrusive

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<sup>236</sup>Carlo E. Ruzza and Oliver Schmidtke, "Roots of Success of the Lega Lombarda: Mobilization Dynamics and the Media," West European Politics 16 (April 1993) : 1.

<sup>237</sup>Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, 60-61.

with less government interference are designed to benefit the NL's biggest group of supporters.

The League's supporters are composed of similar groups that sparked the Poujadist movement in France in the 1950's. There are mainly middle aged males, shopkeepers, small businessmen, artisans and commercial agents in the middle-lower middle class level with a moderate level of education. Recently there has been an increase in its membership of young blue collar workers with mid to lower levels of education.<sup>235</sup> In a break from the Pujadists, the League's electorate does not reject modernity and capitalism. These supporters feel comfortable with the NL and its tough rhetoric gives the impression amongst voters that they are a common man's party as opposed to the intellectually oriented PDS.

The League received a large number of DC crossover votes by its continuous message amongst the voters that their sense of community is under threat not from capitalism but from political parties. This message was accepted by

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<sup>235</sup>Roberto Mannheimer, "The Electorate of the Lega Nord," in The End of Post-War Politics in Italy: The Landmark 1992 Election, ed. Gianfranco Pasquino and Patrick McCarthy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 92.



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<sup>237</sup>Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, 60-61.

role. It criticized the government's actions and publicly quarreled with its two coalition partners. The coalition lasted for only seven months till December 1994 when Bossi withdrew his support of the government over differences with Berlusconi's budget. Since that time he has lost some of his Members of Parliament to defections and in the latest regional elections of April 1995 its electoral strength nationwide declined by two percent.

The future of the League remains unclear. Its opponents criticize it as a movement with no viable solutions to the problems it raises. Its role in government has been destructive rather than constructive. The League has been effective in bringing to the forefront of Italian politics issues that were suppressed since the founding of the Republic. Its main strength lies only in the North and it has not made any significant inroads in the south or central regions. The votes it receives are protest votes and it is not certain that the League can hold these votes in light of newly reformed parties such as the Democratic Party of the Left, National Alliance, and the Italian Popular Party. General elections are tentatively scheduled for October 1995 where its strength will be tested.

### The National Alliance

The success of the National Alliance in the March 1994 national election, was even more stunning and significant than the League's. The National Alliance, a conglomerate of extreme right wing parties of which the Italian Social Movement (MSI) was the most prominent nearly tripled its vote since the 1992 election. Its supporters are a mixture of lower middle class, tradespeople, artisans and unemployed residing in big cities and the "suburban bourgeoisie."<sup>238</sup>

Nicola Tanfaglia a historian at the University of Turin describes the MSI as a party which has reemerged as a mix of "elements of a modern party of the right and of protest" with "residual elements from the final days of Fascism."<sup>239</sup> It appealed to authoritarian conservatives who found the DC too liberal and those who wanted a return to Fascist rule. In May 1994 for the first time since 1943 a party with Fascist members became part of the government with five cabinet seats, seven deputy minister positions and 148 Members of Parliament.

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<sup>238</sup>Furlong, The Extreme Right in Italy, 346.

<sup>239</sup>Alan Cowell, "Italy's Neo-Fascists: Have They Shed Their Past?" The New York Times, 31 March 1994, 4.

The MSI was founded after WWII by young and prominent members of the Fascist regime. It was a mass party that operated through a strong territorial network of sections and clear role definition. It employed a democratic nominating process, strict leadership control over the rank and file and development of a large network of flanking organizations.<sup>240</sup> In almost fifty years it never received more than 6% of the vote but still remained a parliamentary problem. Since it was considered "outside the constitutional arc" the center parties were forced to build coalitions with at least some part of the Left.<sup>241</sup> Throughout its existence the MSI was continually plagued with an image of being undemocratic due to its association with Fascism. It maintained an ambiguous attitude towards Liberal Democracy that centered around a dual strategy implemented by founder and long time party secretary Giorgio Almiranti of the "double-breasted suit with the club."<sup>242</sup> It maintained a respectable presence while simultaneously

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<sup>240</sup>Piero Ignazi and Colette Ysmal, "New and Old Extreme Right Parties," European Journal of Political Research 22 (July 1992), : 102.

<sup>241</sup>Hine, *Governing Italy*, 81.

<sup>242</sup>"Fini's Star Rises," The Economist, 53.

keeping close links with those who used street violence as a form of political activity.<sup>243</sup>

Street violence in Italy is an old practice and tradition that has historically been associated with the MSI. Fascists often clashed with left wing demonstrators employing fists and clubs.<sup>244</sup> Attacks on immigrants are on the rise in Italy and the MSI denies any responsibility for these attacks and strongly condemns them. It emphasizes the social problems that immigrants bring with them and in an approach similar to the NL criticizes the government for the immigrant's social conditions. Many attacks today are carried not carried out by the urban poor but by the "ragazzi perbene" (decent boys) leisured sons of the wealthy professionals.<sup>245</sup>

The far right was responsible for numerous terrorist attacks (bombings) in Italy in the early 1980's in response to the left-wing Red Brigades. The most famous was a train bomb in a tunnel near Bologna which killed 80 people in 1980

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<sup>243</sup>Paul Furlong, "The Extreme Right in Italy: Old Orders and Dangerous Novelties," Parliamentary Affairs 45 (July 1992): 347.

<sup>244</sup>Furlong, The Extreme Right Wing In Italy, 345.

<sup>245</sup>Ibid, .351.

as a backlash against leftist students protests.<sup>246</sup>

Throughout the late 1970' and early 1980's militant Fascists planted their bombs in banks, trains and railway stations. In no case was there any link found with the MSI. The neo-Fascist "strategy of tension" was aimed at eroding popular respect for democracy and ushering in the strong state.<sup>247</sup>

The growth of the Italian extreme right is part of a general European trend but for the most part the National Alliance does not have anything to do with groups like skinheads or Neo-Nazi's whose message is anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia. In Italy there is a separate group of skinheads that number about forty thousand who revere Mussolini and Hitler. On the night of the National Alliance's victory in the March 1994 elections some members of this group marched in the streets with hands raised in the Fascist Salute.<sup>248</sup> The National Alliance serves as a control point to contain "anti-system tendencies" within the

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<sup>246</sup>Ibid., 353.

<sup>247</sup>Roninger, Comparative study of Clientelism, 108.

<sup>248</sup>Cowell, Italy's Neo-Fascists, 1-3.

democratic framework.<sup>249</sup> Its beliefs center around law and order, patriotism and presidentialism. Almiranti's successor Grianfranco Fini successfully transformed his party from committed Fascists and reactionaries into a European conservative party similar to a French Gaulist type.

Fini at forty-two guided the MSI to its greatest victory since its founding. Once described as a "Fascist with a human face," Fini has successfully shaken off the party's image of a Mussolini like organization and injected it with a mode of respectability that keeps increasing its popularity.<sup>250</sup> Fini is pro-American, supports nuclear power, is not an environmentalist and is not anti-Semitic. This sets him apart from other European extreme right wing parties. Reflecting its southern electoral base, the party is centralist in nature and favors a strong state with important welfare functions. This places it in direct

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<sup>249</sup>Sidoti, Significance of the Italian Election, 343.

<sup>250</sup>Daniel Singer, "Berlusconi Turns on the Neo-Fascism," New Statesman and Society 20 May 1994, 24-25. The National Alliance in regional election held April 1995 increased its share of the vote by almost 2% from the European elections of June 1994.

opposition to the NL which often refers to the NA as Fascists.

Fini's and the party's top five priorities are: (1) creation of jobs, (2) making the essential services such as school function properly, (3) fighting the Mafia, (4) combating public corruption and (5) reforming public institutions.<sup>251</sup> He is against illegal immigration and for law and order. He contends that the nationalism the National Alliances calls for is democratic and European minded. He opposes the Maastricht Treaty since it "promotes European integration" and calls for the return of Istria, Fiume and Dalmatia, that were given to Yugoslavia by the Allies after WWII.<sup>252</sup>

In spite of the party's commitment to the democratic process, it still cannot elude its Fascist roots. Upon their victory last year, loud protests were voiced throughout Europe and in the United States on the danger of allowing the National Alliance into government. In the United States, the New York Times, Washington Post, Time and

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<sup>251</sup>Ian Mather, "Fini Goes on a Charm Offensive," The European, 17-23 February 1995,4.

<sup>252</sup>Leo J. Wallenberg, "A Shaky Coalition, How Far to the Right?" Commonweal, 3 June 1994, 8-9.



Newsweek all agreed that the National Alliance "would lead Italy to Fascism." The Alliance was denounced by France, Germany and Greece. The European Parliament warned Italy that "Nazism and Fascism are beyond modern Europe's pale," while the French newspaper Le Monde stated that "Italy had made Mussolinian Fascism into an ordinary thing."<sup>253</sup> The President of the Republic Oscar Luigi Scalfaro took the unprecedented step of asking the Prime Minister designate, Silvio Berlusconi to attest to the loyalty of his cabinet to the Italian Constitution and renounce any plans to divide the country or return it to a Fascist state.<sup>254</sup>

This has prompted Fini to distance himself from the issue of Fascism. At the 1994 Italian Liberation day celebration, He stated that "Fascism was born, flourished and finished with its creator Benito Mussolini" and the "youth of today must be taught history" going even further than just denouncing Fascism, Fini re-affirmed his and the party's belief in democracy by stating "we accept democracy not only as a method of government but as a system of

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<sup>253</sup>Angelo Codevilla, "No, Italy Is Not Going Fascist," Commentary, August 1994, 46.

<sup>254</sup>"Italy Reopens for Business, The Economist, 14 May 1994, 42.

values...We well know the anti-liberalism of totalitarianism."<sup>255</sup> In response to charges of practices of anti-Semitism Fini has repeatedly describe the Holocaust as "an error that led to a horror."<sup>256</sup>

Now that NA is in government it preaches moderation. NA deputy PM Guiseppe Totarella stated that the "Fascist image was removed from the NA by the March 1994 elections."<sup>257</sup> Old hardline member Mirko Tremaglia who represented the traditional wing of the party was excluded from the cabinet. As a defender of Mussolini's Salo Republic, Tremaglia demanded renegotiation of Italy's border with Croatia and Slovenia. The party and Fini are moving forward in removing these associations with the past.<sup>258</sup>

Since the National Alliance entered the government and is under the "constitutional arc" in the short period of time it has governed it has acted responsibly. Its five priorities do not differ from those of the other center-

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<sup>255</sup>Vincent R. Tortora, "The Next Test for Berlusconi: Italy's Second Republic," The New Leader, 9-23 May 1994, 7.

<sup>256</sup>The Economist, 14 May 1994, 42.

<sup>257</sup>Ibid., 52.

<sup>258</sup>Sidoti, Significance of the Italian Election, 343.

right parties. Its popularity remains just under its March 1994 result. Its leader Giancarlo Fini has proved that the party has shed its Fascist past and is able to govern within the constitutional limits. The new direction away from Fasism that the NA has taken will only expand its political base and strength.

### **The Democratic Party of the Left**

In the March 1994 national election, the early frontrunner Progressive alliance, a coalition of left-wing parties led by the PDS lost to the Freedom Alliance. The PDS as the largest of the group led the field with 20.4% of the vote only 0.6% behind winner Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia Party.<sup>259</sup> The party abandoned its Communist image, campaigned on a platform of economic austerity, increased taxes and workers benefits. During the election it presented itself as a status quo party and did not offer any new ideas or effectively counter Berlusconi's platform. It reached the nadir of its popularity in the June 1994 European Parliament election receiving only 19.1% of the vote and resulting in the resignation of party secretary

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<sup>259</sup>Italian Journal No 1&2, 199

Achille Occhetto and replacement by his assistant Massimo D'Alema.

D'Alema, an ascerbic television performer caused a wide split in the party with about half the members supporting Walter Veltroni the editor of the former party newspaper L'Unita.<sup>260</sup> Both D'Alema and Veltroni are very close in their political views except that Veltroni would like to see the PDS become more like the U.S. Democratic Party while D'Alema prefers the British Labour Party model. In either case none of these leaders seems to be able to attract support from outside of the party's left-wing flank. The Refounded Communist Party (RPC) has explicitly refused to "talk in terms of personalities" and asks candidates to state their policies.<sup>261</sup> The RPC will not support candidates based on their popularity with the electorate but rather on they policies and programs they support.

D'Alema's biggest leadership problem is unifying his party and providing it with a message and platform that can regain lost voters. The PDS is presenting itself as a moderate "center-left party" that is similar to Europe's

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<sup>260</sup>David Henderson, Just Like Old Times for PDS, 1 July 1994, 10.

<sup>261</sup>Ibid., 10.

other Democratic Socialist parties. With the demise of the Socialist Party, the PDS is able to occupy the center-ground while the RPC with only about 6% of the vote stand to its left. Not being able to fully implement its plan prior to local elections in November 1994, the PDS continued its downward trend and received only 13.5% of the vote.<sup>262</sup> The government parties also lost due to an ongoing governmental crisis over the budget while independents and Greens received a surprisingly large 40% of the vote, signaling continued voter dissatisfaction with the party system. Since the collapse of the Berlusconi government, the Left has staunchly supported the technocratic government of Prime Minister Lambertino Dini over issues of budget, pension and no confidence motions. The PDS supports the continuation of the government since it is not yet ready to win a national election.

D'Alema's strategy of positioning the party in the center and supporting the government seems to be working. Romano Prodi economist and former DC leader with a record of

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<sup>262</sup>Hanging On, *The Economist*, 59. In these elections, Forza Italia's share of the vote fell to 8.4%, the Northern League to 4.5% and the National Alliance a slight loss to 12.7%. The big gainers were the independents and Greens who captured about 40% of the vote.

honesty, has presented himself as potential leader of a center-left coalition. Prodi now enjoys the support of the PDS, Greens, RPC and Mario Segni's Pact for Italy. This alliance was successfully tested last March in Padua with the PDS candidate winning the mayor's race. In regional elections held April 23, 1995, the center left gained 37% of the vote to the Freedom Alliance's 40.7%. The PDS as the main party won 24.6% of the vote while Berlusconi's Forza Italia took 22.4%. This represent a very encouraging victory for the PDS and provided additional validation as a center left party. It demonstrated it can win and is now gaining support.<sup>263</sup> In these same regional elections, 9 out of the 10 mayoral candidates who qualified for the second round of voting were from the center-left's coalition as were 18 of 20 provincial assemblies which qualified for the second round.

Mr. Prodi believes that the Center-Left alliance will be strong enough to field single candidates under one symbol (an olive tree) in the next general election. He first

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<sup>263</sup>"Berlusconi Bruised," The Economist, 29 April 1995, 58. Forza lost almost 8% since the 6/94 European election and the RPC gained over 2% to 8.4% since the 6/94 elections.

wants to secure the support of the Northern League's Hugo Bossi. Bossi's break with the government resulted in about one-third of his deputies defecting to Forza Italia. Mr. Bossi who was not significantly weakened by the defections has strengthened his hand by his party's regional victories in the North and has hinted that He may strike an electoral pact with the Left. Presently Mr. Berlusconi's popularity is declining and the possibility exists the PDS will win the next election.

#### **The Italian Peoples Party**

Positioned as the true center-party, the Italian Peoples Party (IPP) was created after the demise of the Christian Democrats. Founded by the DC's last leader Mino Martinazzoli, the IPP presents itself as a reformed successor to the DC. The party is preaching a return to the moral values of Don Luigi Sturzo, the founder of the original IPP in 1919.

Martinazzoli while trying to portray his new party as an independent minded group did not enter into any alliances either with the left or the right and received 11.1% of the vote in the March 1994 national elections. Former DC party leader Mario Segni sponsor of the electoral referendums

created his own party called the Segni Pact and both Segni and the IPP ran candidates under the Pact for Italy as an alternative to the Progressive Alliance. Together they received a total of 15.7% of the vote. Martinazzoli criticized for his refusal to enter into alliances with the left or the right brushed aside these criticisms by saying "He refused to align with a 'territorial authoritarian' right or consider the 'salon overtures' of the left and he would not be pushed into bipolarism."<sup>264</sup>

After the national election the party was further weakened by splits and a splinter party the Christian Democrat Center emerged which joined the government in a new cabinet post for the family created by Berlusconi in order to woo Catholic voters. Since the March 1994 election the IPP has suffered from internal arguments and splits. Martinazzoli resigned after his party's lackluster performance in the European Elections and his successor Rocco Buttigilioni served a short time till internal disagreements forced his resignation and defection to

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<sup>264</sup>Edmundo Borselli, "Solution on the Right. The Evolving Political Scenario," Italian Journal, No.1&2, 1994.



Berlusconi. The new leader Geraldo Bianco is faced with a party that is fractured, disorganized and unpopular. In the April 1995 regional elections it received only 6% of the vote. His task is to rebuild a viable center party that can stand independently of the right and left alliances.

### **Forza Italia**

In the fourteen months since Silvio Berlusconi and his right wing partners were swept into power, Italy has experienced: (1) difficulties in establishing a government, (2) arbitrary government policies, (3) the collapse of the fifty-third post-war government and the formation of a technocratic government, and (4) the resurgence of Mafia activity.

The first problem encountered was forming the new government. A difficult process even under the best of circumstance, this first post Tangentopoli government was expected to display the characteristics of enlightened leadership and work towards improving the country in an honest and open manner. Forming the government took almost two months. The wide range of beliefs between coalition members made it difficult to agree on common goals and ministerial candidates. Forza Italia supported

privatization of state assets including the health system and state pensions while the National Alliance favored more state control. The Northern League opposed paying taxes it felt were wasted in the south and pushed for transforming Italy into a federalist state.

Umberto Bossi was the most difficult person to deal with. He wanted negotiations to be about "constitution-building" and not "government building" with the aim of altering the political structure of Italy.<sup>265</sup> Giancarlo Fini interpreted this comment as a "tactical strike to restore party pride and win plum posts in future governments."<sup>266</sup> The National Alliance agreed to the Northern League's demand of a federal state within six months, while the League promised to support the National Alliance's proposal of a directly elected president with greater powers. Actual negotiations on forming the government lasted twelve days and were conducted behind closed doors. Bossi threatened to leave the coalition if his assistant, Robert Maroni was not appointed interior minister and deputy Prime Minister. The appointment of five members from the National Alliance to

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<sup>265</sup>"Italy: Old New Ways." The Economist, 9 April, 53.

<sup>266</sup>Ibid., 53

ministerial posts raised protests. These were quelled when none of the ministers had served in WWII. The largest protest came with the appointment of close business associates of Prime Minister designate Silvio Berlusconi.

Cesare Previtte, Berlusconi's friend and personal attorney initially was chosen as Justice Minister, but due to protests about their friendship and possible conflicts of interest received the Defense Ministry. Guiliano Ferrara, a talk-show host on one of Berlusconi's three television stations was appointed Minister for Relations with Parliament and Gianni Letti, Deputy Chairman of Berlusconi's company Fininvest was appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Prime Minister's office. These appointments raised conflict of interest charges and prompted grumbling by the opposition that "a company had come to power".

Despite Bossi's comments of "never going into government with Fascists," and "Berlusconi could never be Prime Minister" he finally relented and entered into a coalition with Forza Italia and the National Alliance.<sup>267</sup> Bossi's comments and the actions of the coalition parties

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<sup>267</sup>"Coalition Building," The Economist 22 April 1994, 10.

during government formation were identical to their predecessors attempts at forming governments and signaled to the nation, that the break with the past political system had not completely occurred.

Shortly after assuming office, Berlusconi took some actions to increase his control over the state run television and radio corporation (RAI) and the Bank of Italy. By decree he sacked the board of RAI. The decree was immediately canceled by President Luigi Scalfaro but not before the board had resigned in protest. His move to influence the Bank of Italy's policies by placing his appointee's in leading positions raised loud protests from the banking industry which forced Berlusconi to back down. These early actions prompted Umberto Bossi to call for legislation addressing Berlusconi's conflicts of interest between his company Fininvest and his role in government.

Throughout this period Berlusconi was criticized for not delivering on his promise to cut the deficit and his popularity dropped in the polls. Despite this criticism he ignited a firestorm of protest when he tried to impose another decree curbing the magistrates powers of arrest. Although this decree pertained to all actions of the

magistrates, its aim was to try to slowdown if not stop the ongoing Tangentopoli investigation. It drew a large outcry from the magistrates and the public and raised such a furor that the government almost collapsed. The decree was withdrawn, although Berlusconi suffered a major defeat.

Henderson cites three reasons why Berlusconi issued the decree: (1) to repay the debt to former Prime Minister Benito Craxi, who had helped him in years past and now was in exile in Tunisia avoiding trial in Italy, (2) he believed that the public had lost interest with the scandal investigation, and (3) two of his Fininvest employees had been arrested on bribery charges and he wanted to end the investigation.<sup>268</sup> His problems increased when he hosted a dinner attended by Defense Minister Cesare Previti and Under-Secretary for Parliamentary Affairs Gianni Letta, both former Fininvest employees to agree to coordinate responses in a Fininvest investigation where Berlusconi's brother Paolo was placed under house arrest on charges of conniving with officers of Fininvest to bribe tax inspectors.<sup>269</sup>

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<sup>268</sup>David Henderson, "Berlusconi's Own Goal." New Statesman and Society, 29 July 1990. 10.

<sup>269</sup>"Berlusconies," The Economist 30 July 1994, 41.

Despite his problems with the law and his declining popularity there was no movement to unseat him. His coalition partners feared new elections, the fourth in one year would result in a voter backlash against the government as a protest for not resolving the problems of the country. This fear solidified his support and he survived a vote of censure in Parliament in August 1994<sup>270</sup>

Berlusconi announced his budget proposal at the end of September 1994. The financial markets immediately greeted it with relief, while the people met it with protest. The government crafted a budget that would reduce the deficit to less than eight percent of GDP in 1995. It wanted to reform the pension system by reducing the current earnings of retirees from 80% of their salary and raise the retirement age to 65 for men and 60 for women. He was criticized for a budget that placed too much emphasis on spending cuts and not enough on raising revenue. His only plan to raise revenue was through tax amnesties and private investment.<sup>271</sup>

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<sup>270</sup> "Artful Dodger," The Economist, 6 August 1994, 42.

<sup>271</sup> "Berlusconi Beats Up Grandma," The Economist, 1 October 1994, 64-65.

Berlusconi's continual battle with the press, his ongoing problems with the bribery investigation of his company, criticism of the budget and attacks from the opposition caused him to lose credibility with the electorate. His promises of more jobs, less taxes and greater prosperity turned into calls for sacrifice from the people. In spite of demands from his coalition partners, Berlusconi stood firm on his budget proposal. This benefited his other coalition partner Giancarlo Fini. His popularity increased and fostered open talk of Fini as a possible Prime Minister. On 30 September 1994, Fini dissolved the MSI and incorporated it into the National Alliance thereby severing any ties to the Fascist regiment. He has gained great respect and is modeling himself after French Leader Jacques Chirac.<sup>272</sup>

The conflicts and problems that followed Berlusconi were reflected in the November 1994 local elections. Forza Italia suffered a huge loss and saw its electoral strength fall from a high of 30% in the June 1994 European Parliament Elections to 8.4%. During the campaign Berlusconi was

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<sup>272</sup>"Fini's Star Rises, The Economist, 8 October, 1994, 53-54.

battered by reports that his company Fininvest had paid bribes to the tax police prior to him becoming Prime Minister and an even more serious charge of possible arm twisting of the RAI Board of Governors into joining a cartel with Fininvest's own television station. Berlusconi's low vote resulted from his inability to keep campaign promises of honesty, clean government and prosperity. Since he could not rely on his coalition partners for support, Berlusconi became politically isolated. This placed him at the mercy of his coalition partners who at any time could withdraw their support of the coalition.

This quickly occurred when Umberto Bossi withdrew from the coalition and forced the Prime Minister either to resign or lose a vote of confidence. Bossi announced that Berlusconi had "reached the end of the line" with his problems and could not be supported further.<sup>273</sup> Berlusconi and Fini immediately called for snap elections but these requests were rejected by President Scalfaro which brought on a vicious attack on the President from Berlusconi's supporters in government and media enterprises. Government

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<sup>273</sup>"Berlusconi Abbandonato," The Economist 24 December 1994 - 6 January 1995, 49.



spokesman Giuliano Ferrara declared "the President is lending himself to under-the table dealings against the government," and an unidentified Forza deputy demanded that the President seek "psychiatric help."<sup>274</sup>

### **The Dini Government**

On January 17 1995, Lamberto Dini former Head of the Bank of Italy and recent Treasury Minister in the Berlusconi government was appointed the new Prime Minister designate by the President Scalfaro. His goals were to fulfill a short program of reforms to include the pension system, to pass a mini-budget to supplement the December 1994 budget in order to bring the debt under control and reform the anti-trust laws. He presented his cabinet of academics, magistrates, a retired general and civil servants and survived a vote of confidence in spite of Forza and the National Alliance voting against him.<sup>275</sup>

In March 1995 the government presented the controversial mini-budget that proposed: (1) raising taxes on gasoline, (2) increasing the Value Added Tax by 3%, and

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<sup>274</sup>"Italy: Disrepute, The Economist, 14 January 1995, 47-48.

<sup>275</sup>"Dinibopper," The Economist, 28 January 1995, 44-45.

(3) and increasing increase in corporate income tax by 1% to 37%. These proposals were necessary in order to lower Italy's public sector debt which now stands at 120% of GDP. The severity of this budget proposal forced Dini to call another vote of confidence since he could not get Members of Parliament to remove over two hundred amendment which would have rendered the budget useless. The government won by six votes. Forza Italia and the National Alliance abstained, thereby laying the blame for the effects of the budget solely on Dini's shoulders.<sup>276</sup> Having settled the budget crisis, the government was forced to turn its attention to the continuing problem of organized crime.

The resurgence of Mafia activity sparked renewed calls for decisive action. In a ten day period from February to March eight people were killed in Sicily. In March 1995 former Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti was indicted on charges of "Mafia Membership and serving fourteen years as the Mafia's protector in Rome" in return for electing his chosen candidates. Over 800 former Mafiosi have turned state's evidence and there is a renewed attempt of terror

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<sup>276</sup>"The Whirlwind, The Economist, 4 March 1995, 50-51.

against them. In April 1995 the trial of the boss of the Sicilian Mafia Salvatore Riina began. He is charged with the murder of top Mafia fighter Giovanni Falcone in May of 1992 and is also linked to a series of bombings of churches and museums whose aim was to punish Pope John Paul II for his denunciation of the Mafia.<sup>277</sup>

The continuing problems of the economy, politics and crime damaged the Right in the April 1995 regional elections. The Right, predicted to win suffered losses and could not use the elections as a sign of strength in its attempt to get early elections. The PDS made the most gains and with its new candidate for Prime Minister Romano Prodi it appears that the PDS will be a major contender in the next elections.

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<sup>277</sup>“The Mafia Again, The Economist, 11 March 1995, 53.

## Chapter 5

### CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has examined how the Italian political structure collapsed after almost fifty years of stability. Analyzing the system through its clientelistic underpinnings one found a system required to continually maintain clientelistic links in order to remain in power. Its basis of power rested around one center party the Christian Democrats who were in continuous coalition with parties from the center-left: the Socialists, Social Democrats and Republicans and the center-right Liberals. Those who were excluded from any role in government were the extreme left Communists and the extreme right Neo-Fascists. All parties in government had access to patronage jobs which they used to solidify their clientelistic links and broaden their power base. Since the main objective was to deny the Communists any role in government due to their links with the USSR, it was necessary that the Cold War and the Soviet threat be maintained in order to justify the parties remaining in power.

The collapse of Communism the Eastern European countries and later the dissolution of the USSR removed the threat of a Moscow dominated party governing Italy. This shifted the public's attention toward the government parties that ruled since 1948. What they discovered was a political system by political parties operating in a corrupt wasteful manner, infiltrated by organized crime, accepted bribes and maintained a clientelistic network that blurred the line between the state and private sector. This came to light in early 1992 with the first reports of the Tangentopoli scandal. This began a domino effect that resulted in mass arrests on corruption charges and the dissolution of the post-war political system and the rise of a new group of politicians and political parties who claimed to be different than their predecessors.

This thesis has attempted to analyze the causes for the collapse of the "Cold War" Italian political system, to explain the rise in popularity of the Northern League and National Alliance parties and to determine if despite the claims of a new political order and other calls of a second Italian Republic whether this new post-Tangentopoli government is any different that its predecessors.

Prior to answering whether the hypothesis statement that clientelism exists in the post-Tangentopoli was proved three questions had to be answered. These were: (1) how did the old political system exist?, (2) why did it collapse?, and (3) what accounts for the rise in support of the Northern League and the National Alliance? The responses were as follows: (1) the political system centered around the Christian Democrats in coalition with other parties who remained in power by utilizing their extensive clientelistic links to deny the Communist Party a role in government. (2) the post-war political system collapsed due to the end of the Cold War. This allowed the country an opportunity to examine the practices of the ruling political parties and without the fear of a Communist threat all the illegal practices of the parties were exposed. (3) The sudden popularity of the Northern League and the National Alliance was due to both parties non involvement in the Tangentopoli scandal, their new messages of federalism and a strong President and addressing the electorate's concerns about the future.

The hypothesis set out to prove that the clientelistic structure that existed in the previous political order still

existed in the new government elected in March 1994. Based on the analysis of the literature the hypothesis was not conclusively proved. Although the Tangentopoli scandal ended many clientele relationships, the penetration of clientelism into the society was so deep that the removal of several hundred politicians would not be enough to cause the links permanent damage. These associations have now shifted to different allegiances. The winners of the last elections received much of their support from the previously discredited parties. The behavior of the coalition parties did not indicated that they had made a clean break with the past. On the contrary their actions were fairly consistent with previous governments. The constant bickering, stalemates over budgets, attempts to extend government influence into other realms were all done previously. Ongoing investigations into the financial affairs of Berlusconi and the Northern League's operations in their areas indicates some clientelistic practices are still occurring.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Italian political system underwent several massive upheavals. In a series

of two post Cold War elections, the old political order was overthrown by a new group of leaders. These leaders have attempted to set Italy on a new course. Their goal is to restructure the Italian economy and society to be more competitive in the future. This involves a smaller function for government and a greater role for private enterprise. The change that has enveloped Italy in the past six years is not unlike the two step process of the collapse of Communism first in the Eastern European countries and later in the Soviet Union. Although not as radical a change as in the Communist countries, Italy is undergoing its greatest period of instability since the end of WWII.

The present political system has not fully stabilized since the end of the old political order and political parties have not completely recovered from the Tangentopoli scandals. Parties are searching for methods that would regain the people's trust. This condition does not have a quick resolution.

New national elections will likely occur later in 1995. The new electoral system that establishes a first past the



post system for all candidates will result in either two or three major political parties and a reduction of small political parties. This would lead to greater stability in the political system since government formation would not be dependent on small parties which could collapse governments in order to improve their position.

Presently the three largest political parties, Forza Italia, The Democratic Party of the Left and the National Alliance make up just over fifty percent of the vote. The future of the Forza Italia Party is unclear. Its leader Silvio Berlusconi is under investigation on accusations of financial improprieties and bribery as president of his multinational company Fininvest. If these charges bear out it is expected that the party will dissolve and its membership will go to either the Italian Popular Party of the National Alliance. This would serve to bolster the National Alliance and further dissolve it of any Fascist influence and move the party even further toward the center. The Democratic Party of the Left is moving rapidly toward the center and stands to gain with an alliance with either the Northern League or breakaway from the Italian Popular Party. This next election looms as even more important than

the 1992 and 1994 elections since the first past and post system will probably establish a new political system centered around two major parties and will provide greater stability for the nation.

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### List of Abbreviations and Terms Used

PM	Prime Minister
MP	Member of Parliament
CD	Christian Democrat
PCI	Communist Party of Italy
PDS	Democratic Party of the Left: ex PCI
RPC	Refounded Communist Party
PSI	Italian Socialist Party
NA	National Alliance: ex MSI
PLI	Italian Liberal Party
PRI	Italian Republican Party
MSI	Italian Social Movement: Neo-Fascist Party
IPP	Italian Popular Party
PSDI	Social Democate Socialist Party
RAI	State Owned Television & Radio Corporation
IRI	Industrial Reconstruction Institute
ENI	Energy and Chemical Holding Corp.
CLN	Committee of National Liberation

Risorgimento: Process of political unification to create Italy.

Trasformismo: Negotiation on each policy proposal that includes patronage, corruption, wheeling, and dealing so the same party will remain in power.

Tangentopoli: City of bribes. Term used to describe the corruption scandal.

Partitocrazia: Dominance of political parties over the political system.

Lottizzazione: The allocation of patronage jobs and favors based on party strength.

La Economia Sommersa: The submerged, black, or underground economy.

Assestenzialisme: Term used to describe the submerged economy, subsidies, pensions, or disabilities paid to people primarily in the south.

## APPENDIX A

### Italian Electoral Date From 1948-1994 in Percent

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1994</u>
DC	48.4	40.1	42.3	38.3	39.1	38.8	34.4	38.3	32.9	34.3	29.7	
PCI	31	22.6	22.7	25.3	26.9	27.2	34.7	30.4	29.9	26.6		
PDS											16.1	20.4
RPC											5.6	6
PSI	NOTE1	12.7	14.2	13.8	14.5	9.6	9.6	9.8	11.4	14.3	13.6	
MSI	2	5.8	4.7	5.1	4.5	8.7	6.1	5.3	6.8	5.9	5.4	
NATIONAL ALLIANCE												13.5
PSDI	7	4.5	4.6	6.1	NOTE 2	5.1	3.4	3.8	4.1	3	2.7	
PRI	2.5	1.6	1.4	1.4	2	2.9	3.1	3	5.1	3.3	4.4	
NORTHERN LEAGUES								0.5	8.7	8.4		
FORZA ITALIA												21
DP							1.5	1.4	1.5	1.7		
PRad							1.1	3.4	2.2	2.6	1.2	
GREENS										2.5	2.5	2.7
LA RETE											1.2	1.9
IPP												11.1
SEJNI PACT												4.6
DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE												1.2
SVP	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	
PSdA								0.2	0.2	0.4	0.2	
PNM	2.7	6.9	4.8	1.7	1.3							

#### Party Acronyms and Abbreviations

DC	Christian Democrats	DP	Proletarian Democracy
PCI	Italian Communist Party	PRad	Radical Party
PSI	Italian Socialist Party	IPP	Italian Popular Party
MSI	Italian Social Movement	SVP	South Tyrol People's Party
PSDI	Italian Social Democratic Party	PSdA	Sardenian Action Party
PRI	Italian Republican Party	PNM	National Monarchist Party
PLI	Italian Liberal Party	PDS	Democratic Party of the Left

Note 1: PSI in Coalition with PCI in Fronte Popolare

Note 2: PSD united with PSI in 1967 to form the PSU, disbanded is 1968



Appendix B

Annual Rate of Increase of Gross Domestic  
Product in Italy: 1951-1990

1951		1961	8.2	1971	1.6	1981	1
1952	3.8	1962	6.2	1972	2.7	1982	0.3
1953	7	1963	5.6	1973	7.1	1983	1.1
1954	3.3	1964	2.8	1974	5.4	1984	3
1955	6.6	1965	3.3	1975	-2.7	1985	2.6
1956	4.3	1966	6	1976	6.6	1986	2.5
1957	5.1	1967	7.2	1977	3.4	1987	3
1958	4.9	1968	6.5	1978	3.7	1988	3.9
1959	6.6	1969	6.1	1979	6	1989	3.2
1960	6	1970	5.3	1980	4.2	1990	2
AV.1950-1960: 5.3		AV.1961-1970: 5.7		AV.1971-1980: 3.8		AV.1981-1990: 2.3	

Sources: For 1952-60: K. J. Allen and A. A. Stevenson. An Introduction to Italian Economy (London 1974), 51; For 1961-89: Commonwealth of the European Community. Annual Economic Report 1990-91. European Economy, 46 (Brussels, Dec 1990); For 1990: OECD Economic Surveys: Italy 1990/91 (1991). Hine, Governing Italy, 34.

Appendix C

Per Capita GDP 1870-1988 USA=100

	1870	1913	1950	1973	1988
Italy	61	36	28	55	68
Northwest		49	44		88
Northeast		36	27		73
South		27	18		46
USA	100	100	100	100	100

Source: V. Zamagni, *Dalla periferia al centro* (Bologna, 1990).  
Excerpted from Duggan, *A Concise History of Italy*, 278.

## Appendix D

### Unemployment Rates by Age Group and Sex (unemployed persons as a % age of the relevant labour force)

Year	Male			Female		
	14-19 years	20-4 years	25-9 years	14-19 years	20-4 years	25-9 years
<i>Centre-North</i>						
1978	21.3	15.1	4.3	33.0	17.3	9.4
1979	22.0	13.4	3.9	34.3	17.7	9.2
1980	19.9	13.0	4.1	33.1	17.2	9.2
1981	23.6	14.0	4.7	35.5	18.7	10.1
1982	27.4	15.5	5.1	40.0	21.0	10.6
1983	30.1	17.0	6.5	44.9	23.4	12.3
1984	32.3	17.6	6.3	48.5	27.4	11.7
1985	34.4	18.4	6.2	47.4	28.2	13.3
1986	30.9	17.4	6.4	44.1	28.4	14.4
1987	29.5	16.9	6.7	42.7	27.6	15.0
1988	24.3	15.1	6.5	39.8	25.0	14.6
<i>Mezzogiorno</i>						
1978	31.2	23.5	8.6	51.5	41.0	21.7
1979	34.3	25.8	9.3	53.3	40.2	22.3
1980	33.6	27.6	9.9	54.3	43.0	23.3
1981	36.9	29.4	9.9	58.3	46.6	27.3
1982	41.4	30.5	11.4	58.1	47.6	28.2
1983	43.8	31.3	12.3	61.1	49.2	30.5
1984	42.1	32.5	13.3	63.9	52.7	32.4
1985	43.0	35.0	14.1	67.8	53.9	34.1
1986	47.3	36.9	16.6	65.7	57.2	37.5
1987	51.8	41.9	20.3	68.4	61.4	42.6
1988	52.1	44.6	22.3	69.0	64.3	45.7

Sources: ISTAT, 'Rilevazione delle forze di lavoro. Media annua: Nord-Centro Mezzogiorno', Supplemento al Bollettino mensile di statistica, various years. Excerpted from Kostorij, Fuerella, Pado, and Schioppa. Italy the Sheltered Economy. Structural Problems in the Italian Economy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 93.

Appendix E

Unemployment as % of Labour Force

1987	12
1988	12
1989	12
1990	11.5
1991	11
1992	11.6
1993	10.5
1994	11.2
1995	11.1
1996	11

Source: OECD Observer no. 192, February/March 1995

Appendix F

Consumer Prices as a % Change From Previous Year

1987	5.2
1988	5.8
1989	6.2
1990	6.1
1991	6.8
1992	5.2
1993	4.6
1994	4
1995	3.1
1996	3

Source: OECD Observer no. 192, February/March 1995

Appendix G

GDP as % Change From Previous Year

1987	3
1988	4
1989	2.8
1990	2.1
1991	0.8
1992	1.5
1993	1.2
1994	2.2
1995	2.8
1996	2.8

Source: OECD Observer no. 192, February/March 1995

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